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RAYMOND CROSS*

Tribes as Rich Nations
"If you have understanding and heart, show only one.
Both they will damn, if both you show together."'

Efundamental

Emancipating today's American Indian peoples requires a
restructuring of the contemporary concept of
tribal self-determination. Bound by their legal status as tribes,
assigned to them by Supreme Court opinions now almost 200
years old, the Indian peoples are crippled by governing rules of
law that prevent them from realizing any meaningful measure of
self-determination. By resymbolizing the Indian peoples as
"tribes," Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh2 incorporated aboriginal Indian land titles into fee simple
federal ownership, effectively subordinating the Indian peoples
to paramount federal authority. ' Hundreds of linguistically, cul* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Montana. J.D., 1973, Yale Law

School; M.P.A., 1989, Harvard University.
I J.C.F. Holderlin
2 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Justice Reed later described Marshall's opinion
in Johnson as rationalizing the subordinate legal status of the Indian peoples. See
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279-91 (1955). He candidly admitted in his opinion that America's nineteenth century dream of a manifest destiny
would not have been realized but for the Johnson decision. Justice Reed also
bluntly acknowledged the spurious logic by which Marshall extended preemptive
federal title over a vast expanse of Indian lands in the trans-Mississippi region that
were occupied by numerous and powerful Indian peoples who were prepared to
militarily contest the United States' claimed ownership of their lands. Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians, 348 U.S. at 279.
3 Professor Stephen Cornell argues that the "tribe" was created by those European and American negotiators "who searched for and often assumed comprehensive structures of authority or hierarchical political organization" among the Indian
peoples. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 78 (1988). Indeed, Cornell concludes that "[c]omprehensive
political organization at times was even made a prerequisite for [federal] negotiations" with the Indian peoples. Id. at 79.
Marshall's process of incorporating the Indian peoples and their lands within the
American domestic sphere of control was accomplished over the course of his opinions in what is popularly called Marshall's Indian Law Trilogy: Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (incorporating aboriginal Indian land titles into fed[893]
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turally and economically distinct indigenous peoples were assimilated as tribes into the American domestic sphere of control.
Their ostensible sharing of a tribalistic existence helped rationalize Marshall's recharacterizing of fiercely independent and selfsufficient Indian peoples as "domestic, dependent nations" legally subject to paramount federal control.4
Marshall's Indian legal opinions repainted, in a monochrome
reddish tint, the diverse indigenous map of North America so as
to project federal sovereignty over millions of acres of Indian
lands, especially in the hotly-contested terrain west of the Mississippi River.5 Vast areas of the American West were "up for
eral ownership); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (denominating Indian peoples as "domestic, dependent nations"): Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (establishing an exclusive, bilateral relationship between the federal government and the Indian peoples).
4 Ernest Wallace and Adamson Hoebel likewise emphasize that the "tribe," as a
distinct legal or political entity, did not exist among the Indian peoples:
"Tribe" when applied to the Comanche is a word of sociological but not
political significance. The Comanches had a strong consciousness of kind.
A Comanche, whatever his band was a Comanche. By dress, by speech, by
thoughts and actions the Comanches held a common bond of identity and
affinity that set them off from all other Indians-from all the rest of the
world. In this sense the tribe had meaning. The tribe consisted of a people
who had a common way of life. But that way of life did not include political institutions or social mechanisms by which they could act as a tribal
unit.
CORNELL, supra note 3, at 75 (quoting ERNEST WALLACE & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL,
THE COMANCHES: LORDS OF THE SOUTH PLAINS 22 (1952)).

Nonetheless, no indigenous peoples of America, despite their long history as settled, agricultural and civilized Indians, were immune from becoming "tribal" in character and thus subject to paramount federal control. The Pueblo Indians of the
American southwest, once judicially deemed civilized and beyond federal control,
had by the early twentieth century sunk into a "tribalistic" status that warranted
federal control of their lands and members. The Supreme Court concluded that the
"people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations,
and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and
domestic government." United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913). Their
"tribalism" was further evidenced by their "primitive modes of life ... influenced by
superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed [by] . . . crude customs inherited
from their ancestors, they are a simple, uninformed and inferior people." Id. (extending exclusive federal control over the Pueblo peoples and their lands).
5 Noted Indian historian Wilcomb E. Washburn asserts that Marshall recognized
that "title to the real estate of the nation," as well as the "economic and political
demands of the millions [of non-Indians] who now populated the continent," hinged
upon his opinion in Johnson. WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE
MAN'S LAW 65-66 (2d ed. 1995).
Equally noted Indian historian Francis Jennings explains the immense transformation of Indian America wrought by Johnson as evidencing the "transit of civilization." This civilization brought with it European weeds-the ferns, thistles, plantain,
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grabs," and the Marshall Court sought to stake the federal government's claim to as much of that land as it could wrest from
competing European nations. Reducing the Indian peoples to
tribal status was merely one step in this unfolding process of
American Manifest Destiny.6 But this federal process of tribalizing the Indian peoples soon spilled over into their daily lives,
locking the newly created tribal members into a sui generis legal
status as wards of the federal government. 7
Emancipating today's Indian peoples requires a self-determination strategy that will free them from the constraints of their
assigned legal status. However, a substantial federal superstructure has grown up around this status-and conspires to make its
dismantlement extremely difficult. It is composed of debilitating
19th century federal Indian law principles, the deep socio-economic disadvantages that prevent tribal members from fairly participating in today's American society and the vested non-Indian
interests which oppose any meaningful program of tribal self-determination. It is not surprising that tribal self-determination, as
presently conceived and implemented, has made little contribution to the emancipation of today's Indian peoples from those
many omnipresent economic and social ills that have made a
nettles, nightshade sedge-and took away for European use Indian foodstuffsmaize, potatoes, tomatoes, chilies, and yams. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE FOUNDERS
OF AMERICA: FROM THE EARLIEST MIGRATIONS TO THE PRESENT 25-35 (1993).
6 Ironically, President George Washington and War Secretary Henry Knox both

emphasized respect for the Indian peoples' aboriginal land titles and rights. President Thomas Jefferson described the federal government's preemptive right in the
Indian peoples' lands:
not as amounting to any dominion or jurisdiction, or paramountship
whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment
of the present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of
preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be forever.
1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 59 (1984).
7 The ambiguous legal status of individual Indians has occupied the federal courts'
attention since the beginning of the federal-tribal relationship. Early federal court
decisions interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's blanket grant of citizenship to
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof" as excluding Indians. McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 165 (D. Or.
1871). The Supreme Court later adopted that reasoning, holding that an individual
Indian could not free himself from his tribal status by self-help through his voluntary
adoption of non-Indian ways of living. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding
that Indians are "not subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States nor citizens of
the U.S. or the states within which they reside). Id. at 109.
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mockery of self-determination's promise within Indian County.8
My goal is to critique the contemporary doctrine of tribal selfdetermination thirty years after its inception in President Richard M. Nixon's famed 1970 Indian Message to Congress. 9 I focus
on the three most prominent strategies for tribal self-determination. First, I evaluate the tribal strategy that seeks to "morph"
their inherent and reserved sovereign powers into tribal regulatory powers that are effective throughout Indian Country. Second, I assess the tribal strategy that seeks to develop and assert
economic sovereignty over their lands, resources and commercial
relationships as a means of revitalizing Indian Country. Third, I
critique the tribal strategy that seeks to reassert traditional cultural and religious beliefs and practices as a means to regenerate
their societies within Indian Country.
I also compare two rival perspectives on the future of tribal
self-determination. First, I describe and evaluate what I call the
standard model of tribal self-determination within Indian Country. I conclude that this model holds promise only for that relatively small minority of tribes who view wealth creation as the
central feature of their self-determination effort and are willing
to fundamentally reshape their traditional institutions and beliefs
to realize that goal. Second, I describe and evaluate what I call
the transcendent model of tribal self-determination within Indian
Country. I conclude that this approach to tribal self-determination may hold greater promise for those tribes who value cultural
renewal and social revitalization as the central feature of their
tribal self-determination effort.
Given that the tribe, that legal entity created by Marshall's Indian legal opinions, occupies the "design-space"-the legal, economic, and social potentials and possibilities imagined and
8 The poverty rate of the American Indians in 1980 was 40.5%, almost six times
that of the white population. A regional breakdown of the United States shows that
in those regions where the proportion of reservation Indians is the highest, the Indian poverty rate is most severe. KLAUS FRANTZ, INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES:

TERRITORY,

SOVEREIGNTY

AND

SOCIOECONOMIC

CHANGE 108

(1999).
9 President Nixon's 1970 Indian Message emphasized that the "time has come to
break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the
Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions." Message From
The President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 1 (1970).
Nixon's message goes on to say "that we must make it clear that Indians can become independent of federal control without being cut off from federal concern and
support." Id.
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encountered by the Indian peoples-of self-determination, a
brief historical account of the life-cycle of the tribe is in order.
A.

The Life-Cycle of the Tribe

Understanding the historic life-cycle of the tribe-its birth, its
infancy, its adolescence, its untimely death at the hands of federal Indian policy makers and its surprising rebirth-is essential
for the successful reconstruction of tribal self-determination.
1. Birth
Chief Justice Marshall birthed the tribe out of a primal source
that he called "the actual state of things."' ° This pastiche of historical, cultural, economic and geographic circumstances was
orchestrated by Marshall so as to define an exclusive, bilateral
relationship between the federal government and those indigenous peoples who were resident in America at the time of European Discovery." Once fully sovereign peoples, they were
reduced, by the operation of Marshall's "actual state of things,"
to "domestic dependent nations."1 2 Their new status under
10 Professor Rob Williams excoriates Marshall's "actual state of things" as a
trumped-up historical explanation justifying total federal control over the Indian
peoples and their lands. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with
Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 440-42
(1988).
11 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The Worcester decision-as the leading historian of the Marshall Court, Professor G. Edward White,
points out-did not, however, alter one iota the "plight" of the Cherokees or any of
the other Eastern Indian peoples in America during the 1830s:
The Cherokees, and other Indian tribes, became in effect wards of the federal government. The officials of that government were acknowledged to
have the power to do what Georgia had done: place the Indians in the
position of abandoning their cultural heritage-becoming "civilized"-or
being dispossessed of their land and forced to emigrate. Being wards of the
federal government did not mean the Indians in America would have more
freedom or more respect. Their "plight," ostensibly solved, remained essentially the same.
DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 125 (4th ed. 1998), (citing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 732
(1988)).
12 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The Cherokee Nation decision, in the opinion of Professor G. Edward White, represents the Marshall
Court's stark awareness of the precarious practical status of the Eastern Indian
peoples:
The policy of removal . . . and the dire consequences for the [Eastern]
Indian population precipitated a growing concern among a segment of educated nineteenth-century Americans for what they termed the "plight" of
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 897 2000
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American law, intermediate between that of a foreign nation and
that of a purely voluntary association of individuals, Marshall de13
nominated a "tribe.
To Marshall's credit as midwife to the tribe, he resisted the
counsel of those who said that he should abort its delivery. They
argued that it would be an illegitimate birth, born from an illicit
liaison between a suspect legal father, a dubious interpretation of
a discredited sixteenth-century European Doctrine of Discovery,
and a querulous mother, the oddly-crafted Indian Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 4 Only a wildly mischievous
child would result from this union, one who would wreak discord
within America's tightly-knit, constitutionally-structured nuclear
family. Those legitimate members of that family-the states, the
federal government and the American people-critics warned,
would come to resent Marshall's imposition of over 500-plus
"shirt-tail" relatives, the tribes.1 5 These uncouth American relathe Indians... caused by their inability to acculturate.... Most could not
adapt to white customs and institutions: they lacked the inherent qualities
of republican yeoman. While civilizing Indians was preferable to dispossessing them, for humanitarian and paternalistic reasons, the civilizing process did not take in most cases. The result was a "plight": dependency and
poverty or emigration and dispossession.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 102-03.
13

Marshall "contradistinguished [the Indian peoples] by a name appropriate to

themselves" and that name is "tribe."

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. Ste-

phen Cornell suggests that by "tribalizing" the Indian peoples, Marshall may have
been promoting their political maturation:
[T]ribalization could have advantages for Indians. They, too, had political
agendas; they also were in pursuit of peace, secure borders, access to resources available only from their adversaries. Centralized political struc-

tures, often including new leadership positions, had advantages in dealings
with European and American governments and their representatives. As
such dealings came to play a larger role in Indian life, specialized political
organization became increasingly advantageous. It also offered opportunities to ambitious individuals or factions seeking to expand their influence
or power.
CORNELL, supra note 3, at 79.
14 There are just Indians, no tribal nations, according to Justice Johnson in his
concurring opinion in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 25 (Johnson, J., concurring). These Indians, Johnson concluded, are "nothing more than wandering hordes,
held together by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or government
beyond what is required in a savage state." Id. at 27. He warned the Court that to
recognize "every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or nation"
would do great harm to the established political fabric of the United States. Id. at
25. The ongoing economic and political maturation of the Indian peoples and their
'advance, from the hunter state to a more fixed state of society," would undermine
both the federal and state governments' control of Indian lands and status. Id. at 23.
15 This mischief was already afoot, according to Justice Johnson, giving the federal
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 898 2000
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tives would likely clamor for a place at the American family table
and only disharmony would result from forcing the states and the
American people to welcome the tribes to their table.' 6
Marshall's reasons for birthing the tribe remain cloudy and

ambiguous. Some language in his opinions arguably contemplates the future growth and development of the tribe into a mature American government.' 7 But realizing this possibility, given
Marshall's characterization of the tribe as fundamentally inferior
in socio-cultural capabilities, would require the overthrow of
Marshall's famed Trilogy of Indian law opinions. 18 His Indian
law model has resulted in the birth of 500-plus, federally-recogpolicy of "extend[ing] to [the Indian peoples] the means and inducement to become
agricultural and civilized." Id. at 23. But he concluded that the ultimate project of
organizing the Indian peoples into "states" could not possibly be accomplished without "express authority from the states." Id. at 24.
On this point, Indian historian Francis Jennings would agree. Jennings argues that
under the social and political conditions of the nineteenth century the "nation-state"
grew by "dissolving" the Indian peoples. JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 364.
16 Justice Baldwin agreed with Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Cherokee
Nation regarding the mischief that would be created by recognizing any residual
sovereignty in the Indian peoples after their incorporation into the United States.
"Within [Georgia's] boundaries there can be no other nation, community, or sovereign power, which this department can judicially recognize." Cherokee Nation, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) at 47 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
Likewise, theorizing about Indian rights played little role in the thinking of the
non-Indian settler or speculator of the eastern Indian lands. Prucha remarks that
"they saw the rich lands of the Indians and they wanted them." PRUCHA, supra note
6, at 108.
17 Marshall's task in Johnson was to:
[C]onsider not only law but conscience and expediency as well. The "natural" rights of the Indians had to be seen in terms of the "speculative" rights
of the earlier European monarchs, the "juridical" rights of their successor
American states, and the "practical" economic and political demands of the
millions who now populated the continent.
WASHBURN, supra note 5, at 66.
18 Noted Marshall scholar, G. Edward White, describes Marshall's difficulty in
Johnson, and related Indian law opinions, as arising from the distinct legal principles
that he applied to define the Indian peoples' legal status:
The Indians had been the initial possessors of the American continent: the
land and, presumably, the property rights emanating from it were theirs
.... The Indian tribes had been recognized from the outset of white settlement as nations and had entered into legal relationships, such as treaties or
contracts, with whites. Theoretically, then, Indian tribes holding land had
not only rights of sovereignty but a bundle of natural rights deserving of
legal recognition, rights related to the concepts of liberty, property, and
self-determination that occupied so exalted a position in early-nineteenthcentury jurisprudence.
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835,
at 704 (abr. ed. 1991).
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nized Indian tribes, bands and groups, who today reside within
an Indian Country that represents but a tiny fraction of their aboriginal territorial domain. Despite the precatory language in
Marshall's opinions, urging the American nation to assume, as
guardian, the exceptional burden of protecting and civilizing the
"tribe," history has recorded only the hollowness and futility of
his high-flown metaphors and flowery praise of the indomitable
character of Indian peoples. While the federal government exploited Marshall's Indian law opinions as the means to extend
American sovereignty from sea-to-sea, it did not work equally
assiduously to protect or civilize its wards, those Indian peoples
who came to be regarded as barriers to western settlement and
development. 19
2.

Childhood

Other American leaders-such as Presidents Washington, Jefferson and Jackson-were tasked with implementing Marshall's
concept of the tribe in political and diplomatic terms. How
should the federal government deal with this mischievous child,
the tribe? President Washington did so by resymbolizing the
tribe as the "wolf-child." Tribal treaty-making and Indian diplomatic relations were his means of temporarily accommodating
their putative child-like whims, caprices and limited subsistence
needs.2z Federal military force would be used as "predator-control" against those tribes who responded as "wolf" in raiding or
killing American settlers along the frontier.2 ' Washington saw
19 The United States' ongoing commitment to the civilization and protection of
the Indian peoples is evident from its early proclamation in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education shall be
forever encouraged. The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards Indians." Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
But consensus Indian historians agree that the federal government's "civilizing
agenda" was never carried out with any of the Indian peoples. See Clyde Ellis, "A
Remedy for Barbarism":Indian Schools, the Civilizing Program,and the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, 1871-1915, 18 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 85
(1994).
20 Washington emphasized that "policy and [economy] point very strongly to the
expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians." Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 84-85.
21 Washington's Indian policy, which pledged to protect the Indians' homelands
while seeking to survey, sell and create non-Indian political institutions in those very
same lands, "had moved beyond contradiction, to schizophrenia," according to his-

torian Elliot West. ROBERT V. HINE & JOHN MACK FARAGHER, THE AMERICAN
WEST: A NEW INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 121 (2000).
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the tribes as naturally retreating west, like wolves, along with
their prey-the big game animals-who understandably fled
west before the encroaching American line of settlement.2 2
Given the tribes' rapidly declining military powers and populations, as well as their voluntarily or federally-assisted retreat west
of the Mississippi River, Washington and other federal leaders
assumed that they would never have to set a place at the American table for these unruly children, the tribes.2 3
The tribe as perpetual "wolf-child." No wonder why Huck
Finn and Tom Sawyer, American literature's most famous juvenile delinquents, openly envied the lives of the Indian peoples in
the mythical Indian territory. 24 They were the most fervent believers in the growing American myth of the tribe. They-along
with countless other boys throughout Europe and Americahoped against hope that this myth would remain forever truethat the tribe would remain spatially and spiritually far beyond
the reach and taint of American civilization.2 5
Pragmatically, Marshall's tribe served as a protean policy device, content-empty and to be filled in by future federal governments as the tribe's guardian. By revisioning the tribe's role as
America's ward, future federal guardians could resolve any
emerging contradictions or paradoxes created by the American
people's changing attitudes towards the Indian peoples and their
need for more Indian land. This device supported the American
people's growing conviction that the dwindling tribes should not
be entitled to assert exclusive sovereignty over vast expanses of
22 Washington thought that "[s]ettlements will as certainly cause the Savage as the
Wolf to retire, both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in shape." GETCHES ET AL..
supra note 11, at 85.
23 Id.
24 Ironically, Mark Twain's campaign to demolish the "Noble Savage" stereotype
created by James Fenimore Cooper and Francis Parkman is well known. He criticized these writers as "viewing him [the Indian] through the mellow moonshine of
romance." PHILIP S. FONER, MARK TWAIN SOCIAL CRITIC 237 (1958).

Nonetheless, he scandalized the annual dinner of the New England Society in
1881 stating: "My first American ancestor, gentleman, was an Indian, an early Indian .... Your ancestors skinned him alive, and I am an orphan." Id.

25 Leatherstocking, James Fenimore Cooper's fictional backwoodsman, speaking
in 1826 already condemns the extension of American civilization in the wilderness of
Indian Country. Cooper has him decry Judge Temple's vision of building in the
forests, "towns, manufactories, bridges, canals, mines, and all the other resources of
an old country." HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 21, at 476. Leatherstocking argues

against civilization saying, "[Tihe garden of the Lord was the forest" and was not
patterned after the "miserable fashions of our times, thereby giving the lie to what
the world calls its civilizing ... ."Id.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 901 2000
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hunting and roaming lands that could easily accommodate
thousands of non-Indian farmers, ranchers and future
industrialists.2 6
3. Adolescence
Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer routinely threatened to "light out
to Indian Territory" to escape their Aunt Polly's rigid brand of
the Protestant work ethic.2 7 Many real Americans and Europeans did just that beginning in the 1830's. Their shared motivation
was to escape the dreary constraints of the school-house, workhouse, jailhouse and business firm. This led countless European
and American artists, writers, mountain men and criminals to
flee to Indian Country.2 8 Add to that influx those many escaped
African-American slaves who found a different type of emancipation among the tribes, and you will see why so many non-Indians had a stake in maintaining Marshall's myth of the tribe.2 9
26 John Sevier's natural liberties philosophy served to legitimate the aggressive
attitudes of the frontiersmen. He argued that the "law of nations... agree[s] that no
people shall be entitled to more land that they can cultivate." PRUCHA, supra note
6, at 108. His frontiersman's philosophy triumphed because the federal government
made only sporadic and feeble military efforts to regulate the non-Indian pressure to
settle Indian lands. Id. at 111-12.
27 See generally FONER, supra note 24, at 236-38.
28 The American frontier had spawned a subculture of a breed of lawless, sometimes depraved, men who lived off clandestine trade with the Indians. The Indian
fur trade literally created these men who went off with their packs for months on
end into the wilderness. Paul Prucha emphasizes that though they often took Indian
wives, they nonetheless "mercilessly exploited the Indians, debauched them with
whiskey, and robbed them of their furs." PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 95.
By contrast, the authentic portrayal of the vanishing Indian way of life on the
Great Plains is what motivated painters such as Samuel Seymour, George Catlin and
Karl Bodmer to make the dangerous trek into Indian Country. Seymour's goal was
to paint portraits of Indians and reproduce landscapes noted for their "beauty and
grandeur." Catlin avowed that "nothing short of the loss of my life shall prevent me
from... becoming [the Indians'] historian." HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 21, at
481. He had "flown to their rescue-not of their lives or of their race (for they are
'doomed' and must perish), but to the rescue of their looks and their modes." Id. at
482. Bodmer, who accompanied Prince Maxmillian on his visits to the Mandan villages of the Upper Missouri River, used his painting skills to provide an artistic
accompaniment to his patron's ethnographic writings. His paintings are used today
in reconstructing the traditional clothing, rituals and life-ways of his Indian subjects.
Id. at 482-83.
29 "[Slaves who lived near] the Indian nations.., frequently tempted fate by striking out for freedom." JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER, RUNAWAY
SLAVES: REBELS ON THE PLANTATION 25 (1999). Professor Franklin asserts that

these runaway slaves were "more likely to head for the [Indian nations than] the
[ostensibly free area of] Ohio." Id. at 121.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 902 2000

Tribes as Rich Nations

What did all these non-Indian escapees to Indian Country have
in common? They sought to restore a palpable freedom, drama
and challenge to lives that had grown cold and predictable under
civilization's weight.3" But it was the brief flowering, during the
short-lived adolescence of the tribe, of the "horse and gun"
Great Plains Indian culture that truly cemented the American
myth of the tribe.3 The Cree and Ojibway had received the
horse and the gun from French fur traders in the early 1800s.
This newly available technology spread rapidly to the tribes of
the Great Plains, the horse giving them mobility and the gun giving them firepower. These two technologies combined to create
a tribal "high-culture" period during which the Great Plains Indian peoples lived lives organized around raiding, inter-tribal
warfare and buffalo hunting.3" With the horse and the gun they
were also able to seriously impede, if not completely stem, the
illegal incursion by thousands of non-Indians who crossed the
Great Plains en route to Oregon and California, killing the buf33
falo and other big game as they went.
The cycle of Indian treaties negotiated by President Johnson's
Indian "Peace Commission" between 1867 and 1868 guaranteed
many of the Great Plains tribes the "exclusive use and occuHe also quotes a federal military officer stationed in south Georgia in the early
nineteenth century who asserts that he "[has] ascertained beyond any doubt [that] a
connection exists between a portion of the slave population and the Seminoles" so
as to facilitate Indian raids on the plantations. Id. at 87.
30 Teddy Roosevelt, after the death of his wife in childbirth, left his baby daughter
in the care of family members and headed to the Dakotas to live for three years on a
cattle ranch. His motive was to feel the "beat of hearty life in our being ...the glory

of work and the joy of living."

HINE

&

FARAGHER,

supra note 22, at 496.

Likewise Owen Wister, the famous writer, went west to regain his health and to
"[free] himself from what to him was a deadly life" as a Boston businessman. Id. at
497.
31 Horses, either stolen by Indians from the Spaniards or re-domesticated by them
from the wild, appealed strongly to the Plains Indians. So strongly, in fact, that
Professor Francis Jennings concludes that the horse "stimulate[d] revolutionary cultural change from sedentary horticulture to the mobility of hunters and raiders of
'horse Indian' fame." JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 166.
32 Professor Hine argues that the horse allowed the "Indian peoples to reclaim the
. .. American heartland" and become the "first settlers of the Great Plains.
HINE

&

FARAGHER,

supra note 22, at 138.

Thus, the "mounted warrior of the plains-the ubiquitous and romantic symbol of
native America-was in fact not an aboriginal character at all but one born from the
colonial collision of cultures." Id.
33 Killing the bison, Professor Jennings concluded, was seen by the non-Indians as
a "quick way of getting rid of the Indians who were also conceived of as vermin."
JENNINGS,

supra note 5, at 372.
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pancy" of their vast hunting and roaming areas. 34 But as a practical matter, the federal government proved both unable and
unwilling to protect tribal lands from non-Indian intrusion.
The federal government sought instead in the 1870s to renegotiate these treaties so as to require the tribes to give up their
nomadic way of life in favor of farming and ranching. But this
suggestion was particularly objectionable to those tribes who saw
farming as suitable employment only for women or the disabled.
Other tribes saw farming as sacrilege and disrespectful of the
earth itself. Not surprisingly, few tribes agreed to voluntarily settle down and forego hunting, raiding and roaming in their traditional areas and during their traditional seasons.35 This blatant
tribal resistance to "growing up" justified, according to federal
policy makers, the use of military force to settle the recalcitrant
tribes on newly-established Indian reservations.3 6
Forcing the resistant Great Plains tribes onto reservations
proved to be easier said than done. They rarely had much
trouble escaping the army columns sent to round them up. 37 Entire camps, including women, children and the elderly, proved
elusive targets in terrain where an unobserved approach by an
army column was extremely difficult. If the troops pressed too
closely, the Indians would disperse, forcing the army commander
to either give up pursuit or persist against a steadily diminishing
target.38
But, despite the tribes' successful guerrilla tactics, the tide
slowly turned against their continued resistance. Federal soldiers
would routinely destroy the camp equipment and household
materials of those Indians who fled to escape reservation life.
They would likewise seize or destroy the Indian pony herds they
captured.39 Combined with the ongoing, non-Indian slaughter of
34 Marshall's Indian law decisions and later federal Indian treaties confirmed the
Indian people's exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast hunting and roaming
reserves in the American West. CORNELL, supra note 3, at 45-50.
35 Few Indian peoples tried to adopt agriculture because, among other reasons,
they had been "pushed into places where soil was poor and water was scarce." JEN-

NINGS, supra note 5, at 372.

36 That the Indians who wiped out Custer's troops did so in defense of their families is crystal clear to Professor Francis Jennings. "[B]ullheadedly disregarding
warnings and defying orders," Custer was "on the way to perpetrate another in a
series of his own [Indian] massacres." Id. at 377.
37 WILLIAM T. HAGAN, How THE WEST WAS LosTr, INDIANS IN AMERICAN HisTORY 182 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1988).
38

Id.

39

Id. at 183.
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the buffalo for their hides in the 1870s, there was little hope that
the Great Plains tribes could long maintain their war of resistance against the federal government.4 0
By recharacterizing those tribes who resisted reservation settlement as savages and malcontents, the federal government
sought to mobilize American public sentiment in favor of its
ruthless "search and destroy" military missions. Ironically, it was
just one such mission that resulted in the tribes' greatest military
triumph over federal army troopers. On June 25, 1876, at the
Battle of the Little Bighorn, the combined Indian forces of Sioux
and Cheyenne warriors killed over half of the army troopers in
the Seventh Cavalry Regiment.4 This Indian victory spawned a
wave of American vengeance against any tribe that resisted settlement on a reservation under the watchful eye of federal
troops.42
Resymbolized as unfeeling, bloodthirsty savages who understood and respected only greater cruelty than they could inflict,
the Indian peoples were successfully recharacterized by the federal government in a new light. 43 No longer the impulsive, willful
child who had to be placated with flowery promises and cheap
trinkets, the Indian had been recast as the malevolent "other." It
was he-the treacherous, unscrupulous red-devil who raped
40

Id. at 184.

supra note 5, at 377.
The military subjugation of the Apaches, Sioux and Nez Perce by the federal
cavalry in the 1870s marked the effective end of armed Indian resistance on the
Great Plains and in the Far West. The collapse of Indian military might left the
Indian peoples vulnerable to retributive congressional action and the pressures of
treaty negotiators. Cornell cites the words of Shoshone Chief Washakie in 1878 as
the closing eulogy of this era: "Our fathers were steadily driven out, or killed, and
we, their sons, but sorry remnants of tribes once mighty, are cornered in little spots
of the earth all ours by right-cornered like guilty prisoners and watched by men
with guns." CORNELL, supra note 3, at 50.
43 The reportrayal of the Indian as killer was abetted by the writers of the dime
novels who produced an "objectified mass dream" that mapped. the fixations of their
readership on "savage redskins, vicious greasers and heathen Chinese" who were
routinely "laid low" by conventional white heroes. HINE & FARAGHER, supra note
21, at 478.
But it was Teddy Roosevelt in his multi-volume work, Winning of the West, who
officially legitimated this view of the Indian as unredeemably cruel and treacherous:
Not only were they very terrible in battle, but they were cruel beyond all
belief in victory ....
The hideous, unnameable, unthinkable tortures practiced by the red men on their captured foes, and on their foes' tender women and helpless children, were such as we read of in no other struggle,
hardly even the revolting pages that tell the deeds of the Holy Inquisition.
Nathan Glazer, American Epic: Then and Now, PuB. INTEREST, Winter 1998, at 12.
41 JENNINGS,
42
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white women for pleasure and burned wagon trains for entertainment-who merited extermination if he refused to settle on the
reservation. It was he who would be forever engraved on the
American consciousness as symbolizing the uncontrollable, and
therefore dangerous, aspects of an uncivilized human nature. It
was he who would be endlessly shot, stabbed, hung, starved, dismembered, buried or burned alive, without a tear shed, in those
countless popular western melodramas passed off as the "dime
novel" American epic of the Winning of the West.4 4
4.

Death

Mid-nineteenth century federal Indian policy, embodied in a
principle of "measured tribal separatism," assumed the Great
Plains tribes-influenced by treaty annuities, education and nonIndian missionaries-would voluntarily adapt to a non-Indian
way of life.4 5 But soon after the end of the Indian wars in the
1870s and the settlement of those tribes onto reservations, western congressmen and the BIA condemned the separatism policy
as being too soft on tribalism. It had only served to encourage
the false hope among the tribes that they could somehow continue their hunting and roaming way of life.46
What the tribes required, these reformers argued, was the
stern hand of a federal guardian who treated them, not as semisovereign peoples capable of treaty making, but as what they had
44 By the 1880s the bloodthirsty Indian warrior had become a mere stage prop for
furnishing the American stage set of the "winning of the west." It was Buffalo Bill
Cody's "Wild West Shows" of that era that embodied these "dime novel illusions in
flesh and blood." HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 21, at 501. Cody shot, killed and
scalped a Cheyenne warrior and added the Indian's scalp to his show for his audience to feel and touch, thus converting melodrama into the flesh of reality. Id.
45 By statute in 1834 Indian Country was defined as:
[A]I1 that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within
the states of Missouri or Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also,
that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within
any state to which Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purpose of
this act, [shall be] deemed to be Indian Country.
Regulation of Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes Act, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
Later, many Great Plains Indian peoples, in exchange for giving up expansive
claims to their aboriginal territories, reserved, by treaty, vast hunting and roaming
areas for their exclusive use and occupancy. They were assured by the federal government that "as long as [the] rivers run" those lands would be theirs. GETCHES ET
AL., supra note 11, 140-41.
46 Bishop Whipple, among other influential friends of the Indian, wanted President Lincoln to treat the Indian peoples as governmental wards, not as members of
quasi-sovereign political entities. PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 470.
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become-dependent governmental wards. The tribe was viewed
by these reformers as the major impediment to quickly converting tribal members into farmers, ranchers and wage-laborers.
They consciously under-emphasized the side benefit of their proposed Indian allotment program-the release of millions of acres
of tribal trust lands to non-Indian settlement.4 7
But many treaties with the Great Plains tribes had guaranteed
the territorial integrity of the tribes' reserved lands. 48 Modification of those territorial boundaries required a favorable vote by
at least a majority of the adult male members of those tribes.4 9
To accomplish their goals, these Indian reformers would have to
breach these Indian treaties long deemed to be part of the controlling law of the land under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. Their attack focused on what they
called "the evils of tribalism": communal Indian land tenure; extravagant give-aways by wealthy tribal members to their less fortunate tribesmen; week-long inter-tribal festivals and pow-wows
and traditional celebrations of heathen religious practices such as
the Sun Dance ceremony. Branding tribalism as anti-American,
as well as heathen in nature, they recruited a wide array of supporters to their anti-tribalism crusade: mainstream religious organizations who sought to evangelize the Indians; non-Indian
ranchers and farmers who coveted the Indians' prairie and arable
land base; land-starved emigrants from Scandinavia and elsewhere who arrived too late to obtain homesteads under the 1862
Homestead Act; and those liberal friends of the Indian who
47 The reform-minded Board of Indian Commissioners had come to support the
principle of Indian allotment as a means of assimilating and civilizing the Indian
peoples. At the famous Lake Mohonk Conference in 1884, the Board endorsed
"heartily" the allotment concept. Non-Indian settlers supported allotment because
it would eventually release millions of acres of Indian lands as "surplus lands" for
non-Indian entry and settlement. PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 659-71.
48 Marshall's Indian law decisions and related federal treaties confirmed the Indian peoples' exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast bunting and roaming
reserves in the American West. CORNELL, supra note 3, at 45-50.
49 Article 12 of the 1867 treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians
provided that:
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein
described, which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force
against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least threefourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by
the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive,
without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any
tract of land selected by him as provided by Article III (VI) of this treaty.
Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, Oct. 21, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
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wanted to salvage those Indian people who could successfully
adapt to a non-Indian way of life.5 0
The federal government's resulting war on tribalism from the
1880s to the 1930s resymbolized the complex, life-affirming, cultural and social practices of diverse Indian peoples as the major
road block to their assimilation into American society. 5 But
freeing up Indian lands for non-Indian use, rather than emancipating individual tribal members from the clutches of superstition and communal land holding, was the real goal of the 1880s
Indian reform movement.5 2
This goal was to be achieved via the General Indian Allotment
Act of 1887. 53 Its provisions envisioned the federal assignment
of homestead-sized parcels of agricultural land to each eligible
tribal member on reservations throughout Indian Country.
Those Indian lands that were deemed surplus to the allotment
needs of a particular reservation would be "opened" for settlement and sold to non-Indian homesteaders for about a $1.25 an
acre. The funds obtained from the sale of surplus Indian lands
would be deposited to the affected tribe's United States Treasury
Account. Those funds could be expended, in the federal government's discretion, for the civilizing and subsistence needs of the
affected Indians.5 4
The avowed goal of Indian allotment was the destruction of
both tribes and tribalism.5 5 The federal government could assert
direct control over its newly-created class of Indian allottees only
if tribes were effectively removed as governing institutions.
However, the Great Plains tribes, like the Kiowa and Comanche,
fiercely resisted allotment. Led by Chief Lone Wolf of the Kiowa and Comanche Indians, they challenged in the United States
Supreme Court the federal government's power to breach its sovereign agreements guaranteeing the territorial integrity of reserved Indian lands.56 The Supreme Court rejected Lone Wolf's
challenge to Indian allotment and modified federal Indian law so
as to accommodate the changed status of the tribes as govern50 PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 659-71.
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358, 381 (1994).
54 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 165-75.

55 Id. at 166-67.
56 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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mental wards.57 In its 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock5 8 ,
the Court completed its subordination of the tribe to federal plenary power.5 9
The disastrous empirical consequences of allotment for the Indian peoples are well-known. About 90-100 million acres of Indian lands were lost to tribal ownership, leaving a tribal trust
land base of only some 40 million acres to support the surviving
Indian peoples.6 ° Much of this lost tribal acreage fell into nonIndian ranchers' and farmers' hands or reverted to the states for
non-payment, by those "competent" Indian allottees, of local
property taxes.6 1
Few commentators have addressed the qualitative effects of allotment on the Indian peoples. I will briefly comment on these
issues. First, allotment displaced traditional tribal land uses in
favor of intensive, land-degrading ranching and dry-land farming
practices by non-Indian settlers and Indian allottees. The health
of the remaining Indian range and agricultural land-base quickly
deteriorated due to these altered land use patterns. 62 For exam57 From Justice White's viewpoint, the Indian peoples' right of occupancy was not
equivalent to ownership of their lands. The federal government was owner of those
lands and could effect a change in the Indians' use of those lands if it was necessary
for the Indians' benefit. Id.
58 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Professor David Getches places Lone Wolf's struggle
against forced allotment of the Kiowa-Comanche reservation within the Indian pantheon of resistance actions that resisted the placement of their peoples on "the white
man's road." GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 190.
59 Professor Blue Clark places the Lone Wolf decision in the larger, international
law context when he analyzes Henry Cabot Lodge's reliance upon that decision,
among other Indian law decisions, as the basis for the United States' assumption of
guardianship over "domestic, dependent nations" during Senate debates over the
federal government's assumption of guardianship over the "dark-skinned" peoples

of the Philippines.

BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V. HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS AND
INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 102-3 (1994).

60 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 165-71.
61John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs during the 1930s and early 1940s,
testified before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee in 1934 regarding the adverse
effects of allotment on Indian land use and ownership and said:
Through the allotment system, more than 80 percent of the land value belonging to the Indians in 1887 has been taken away from them; more than
85 percent of the land value of all allotted Indians has been taken away.
And the allotment system, working through the partitionment or sale of
the land of deceased allottees, mathematically insures and practically requires that the remaining Indian allotted land shall pass to the whites. The
allotment act contemplates total landlessness for the Indians of the third
generation of each allotted tribe.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 172.

62 Commissioner Collier testified before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee in
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pie, prior to allotment on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
in North Dakota, tribal families subsisted largely on produce
from their communally-farmed gardens. This gardening represented primarily the labor of tribal women, but some men did
assist them.63 Along with hunting and berry-gathering, this community gardening sustained generations of Indian people on Fort
Berthold, as well as on other reservations. Allotment rendered
that continued agricultural use impracticable on those reservations. The boosters of allotment predicted that it would stimulate the rise of a hardy, self-reliant, yeoman class of Indian
farmers and ranchers. The reality was that Indian allotments on
virtually all of the allotted Indian reservations fell into disuse and
decay. 4
Second, allotment encouraged tribal members to shed their tribal identities in favor of American citizenship.6 5 By voluntarily
accepting an allotment and by successfully completing their transition into successful farmers or ranchers, tribal members could
earn American citizenship. 66 By this means the federal government sought to undermine the significance of tribal affiliation.
1934 that allotment "precluded the integrated use of the land by [Indian] individuals
or families, even at the start." Id. at 171.
63 Professor Virginia Peters stresses that "[blefore the Europeans arrived the village tribes had engaged in a centuries-old pattern of intertribal barter, using corn,
raised by the women, as their medium of exchange." VIRGINIA B. PETERS, WOMEN
OF THE EARTH LODGES: TRIBAL LIFE ON THE PLAINS 143-57 (1995).
64 Id.

65 Historian Fergus M. Bordewich speaks to federal ceremonies held on various
Great Plains reservations in the 1880s designed to impress upon would-be Indian
allottees the importance of federal citizenship:
An outdoor ceremony was staged at Timber Lake to impress the allottees
with the importance of citizenship. They stood resplendent in the feathers
and fringed buckskin of a bygone age, facing Major James McLaughlin, a
shrewd and hard man who was known to all Sioux as the Indian agent who
had ordered the arrest of Sitting Bull in 1890. Ramrod-stiff, cigar in hand,
McLaughlin watched as each Indian solemnly stepped from a tepee and
shot an arrow to signify that he was leaving behind his Indian way of life.
Moving forward, he then placed his hand on a plow to demonstrate that he
had chosen to live the farming life of a white man. He was next handed a
purse to remind him to save what he earned. Finally, holding the American flag, the Indian repeated these words: "Forasmuch as the President has
said that I am worthy to be a citizen of the United States, I now promise
this flag that I will give my hands, my head, and my heart to the doing of all
that will make me a true American citizen." It was the culminating, transformative moment of which Dawes had dreamed.
FERGUS M.

BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN:

TIVE AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

66 Id.
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However, few Indians valued American citizenship enough to

sacrifice their tribal identities in an effort to become successful
Indian ranchers and farmers.6 7 Those relatively few Indian allot-

tees who did assimilate to a non-Indian way of life were deemed
by their tribesmen to be "white Indians."68
Third, allotment encouraged Indian parents to send their children to the newly-created federal Indian boarding schools. 69 An
American-type education was deemed to be the most reliable
means for assimilating Indian children into a non-Indian society.7" It was the archetypal means for disabusing those children
of their inherited tribal superstitions and beliefs, and it was also
the means of separating those children from their parents, clanuncles and clan-aunts who remained behind in the Indian
camps.7
Fourth, allotment fundamentally resymbolized the Indian peoples' relationship to their lands as well as to their fellow
tribesmen.7 2 By insisting that the Indian must repudiate his tri67 Historian Bordewich concludes that the allotment process intended to "transform Indians into yeoman farmers" but instead "sapped the vitality of traditional
tribal government, and terminated the possibility that Indian societies might be able
to evolve at their own pace according to their own standards." Id. at 124.
68 "Blood fusion" between tribal Indians and non-Indians was a process that allotment accelerated as a means of assimilating the Indian people into American society. Id. at 328-29.
69 Indian education in off-reservation, federally-run, boarding schools was the
brain-child in 1879 of Captain Richard Henry Pratt. He considered Indian reservation life as a morally repugnant form of segregation, but nonetheless advocated the
physical separation of Indian children from their parents and families so as to promote their assimilation in a non-Indian way of life. He argued that the Indian is
"born a blank," and with neither "ideas of civilization nor savagery." Id. at 282.
70 Id.
71 Id.

72 The Mandan and Arikara women's historic relationship to the land represented
an interlacing of sexual, social and economic statuses within their village life along
the Missouri River. Professor Virginia Peters powerfully depicts this complicated
relationship by writing:
Many young men and a few of the old helped pick the ears of ripe corn as
they had during the green corn harvest. For this the women paid them by
building fires near their piles of corn on which they placed kettles containing corn and meat. The men and girls were all painted and dressed in their
best clothes. The prettiest girls always had the largest group of young men
around their piles of corn. As the husking proceeded, any unripe ears were
[placed] aside to become the property of the male helpers. They either ate
them or fed them to their ponies; the women did not want them because
they would rot and spoil the ripe corn if placed in caches.
Although there was much rejoicing and jollity at harvest time, there was a
serious undertone. The village women felt a sacred duty to be sure that
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bal identity as the means of entering American society, allotment
demonstrated the federal government's deep fear and mistrust of
tribalism. As a practical matter, the only goal that allotment
achieved was that it transferred millions of acres of Indian lands
to non-Indians. Colorado's Senator Henry Teller was the lone
voice protesting the Indian allotment bill in the Senate, and he
predicted that allotment would impoverish the Indian both economically and spiritually. All contemporary commentators agree
that allotment did realize that goal.7 3
By creating a deep psychological divide between the Indian
peoples and their lands, it created new, antagonistic classes of
Indians. Class membership was defined by possession of greater
and lesser degrees of tribal blood. Members of these classes allegedly responded differently to the economic and social incentives offered by the allotment program. A new class of Indian
cultural brokers arose; Indian men and women who could interpret the allotment directives of the newly empowered BIA to the
"blanket Indians"-usually those greater than half-blood tribal
members who resisted allotment in particular and civilization in
general. 4
every ear of corn was gathered and used for some purpose. A missionary
told Wilson that an Arikara woman whom she knew dropped every seed
with a kind of prayer. The Arikara legend of the "Forgotten Ear" emphasizes the women's love for their gardens and the food they produce. One
day an Arikara woman thought she heard a child begging not to be left
behind when she started to leave her field. She searched through her
whole garden until at last she finally found one small ear of corn which she
had overlooked. As soon as she gathered in the corn, the crying stopped.
PETERS, supra note 63, at 119-20.
73 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 171-73.
74 A brief case study of how allotment created and sustained class divisions among
the Indian peoples on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North Dakota, from
the late 1880s to the 1990s is provided by Professor Castle McLaughlin. See Castle
McLaughlin, Nation, Tribe, and Class: The Dynamics ofAgrarian Transformation on
the Fort Berthold Reservation, 22 AMER. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 101 (1998).
He describes a relational model that was "generated over time by the 'structured
context' of the [Fort Berthold] reservation['s] political economy and in response to
the situated positions and social identities of others." Id. at 105.
McLaughlin emphasizes that Indian allotment on Fort Berthold and other Great
Plains Indian reservations had as its goal the "dissolution of tribal organization and
the assimilation of Indian individuals ... [via] the adoption of practices and values
associated with a capitalist democracy, such as the nuclear family organization,
Christianity, the 'Protestant ethic,' and utilitarianism." Id. at 106.
He describes the application of the allotment process on Fort Berthold:
As on other reservations, agrarian enterprises-first farming, then livestock production-were used as a vehicle for promoting individual "civilization" at Fort Berthold. Cattle were first distributed as part of a federal
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Allotment also resulted in a deeply disaffected class of Indian

men and women. They bought into its personal emancipatory
promise that, by obtaining an American-style education, they
could bridge the great social distance between their discarded tribal identities and assume a new life as an esteemed American
professional such as a lawyer, educator, doctor, or political

leader. Many of these individuals became the objects of derision,
laughed at openly by Indian and non-Indian alike for their pretentious airs.75
By exacerbating political and social tensions within reservation
population segments-particularly the animosities between the
full-blood and half-blood factions-allotment sought to explode
payment following an 1886 agreement (ratified in 1891) by which the Fort
Berthold people relinquished 228,168 acres of their 1,193,788-acre reservation and agreed to the allotment of the remaining 965,620 acres. Between
that year and 1902, the U.S. government spent $140,000 of tribal funds on
livestock, and the number of Indian-owned cattle rose from 400 to 7,000
head. Prior to a 1910 land cession, the sale of beef to the government and
to markets such as Chicago accounted for nearly half of the total income on
the reservation. While "unearned income" from land sales and leases became the most significant income source after 1910, during the following
decade the value of crops raised ($367,549) and the livestock sold
($419,984) at Fort Berthold far surpassed income from (primarily per diem)
wage labor ($144,951).
Id. at 107.
75 Allotment and related federal financial-assistance programs directed to foster
Indian ranching enterprises on the Fort Berthold Reservation have resulted in classbased conflict between the Indian landowning community and the ranching community. Here is how McLaughlin describes this conflict in the 1980s and 1990s on Fort
Berthold:
Class consciousness has developed from both opposing material interests
and contrasting ideological and moral frameworks that guide interaction
between people and the natural world. Landowners have been led to assign commodity values to their lands and have constructed their identity in
part from their inability to control and realize "fair returns" for its use:
they have developed a keen sense of their position within the local political
economy. Unequal relations of exchange, not production per se, have engendered the construction of these class identities. Ranchers are viewed as
having repudiated the signs and practice of reciprocity, which both functions as a material "safety net" and serves as metaphor for the commensal
social order: "Half of us are starving, but they'd die before they'd give us a
beef." Age, gender (most [Indian] landowners are tribal elders, and today
many are women), internally perceived racial differences (many ranchers
are of mixed heritage), and commitment to traditional values are all drawn
on for the discursive construction of materially reproduced differences.
One young landowner characterized conflict between ranchers, landowners
and the tribe as "spiritual warfare" and forecast, "Eventually, the tribe will
end up buying all the land, and then Uncle Sam will come and collect."
Id. at 124.
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tribalism from within. Traditionalists, those Indians who opposed the BIA and its civilizing programs, were said to represent
the full-blood reservation political contingent. They were at odds
with the modernists, those Indians who sought to shape the
BIA's civilizing programs to their benefit, who were said to represent the half-blood reservation political contingent.
Allotment sought to explode tribalism from the inside by mapping new economic and social incentives onto intra-tribal relations. It encouraged those more astute, better educated Indians
to assert their individual interests at the expense of their less
well-endowed tribesmen. It sought to recruit the newly created
allottees as agents of social change who would transform tribalism from within.7 6
It also introduced exotic agents of social change into tribalism.
It encouraged non-Indian farmers and ranchers to undermine
traditional tribal land uses by seizing the opportunity to lease Indian lands from the BIA at cut-rate prices. By inter-marrying
with tribal women and cooperating with the BIA in managing
fractious tribal members, these non-Indians became the most
conservative force in opposing future efforts at tribal self-determination.7 7 Allotment also created a new class of landless Indians by later allowing disabled or incompetent tribal members to
sell or lease their allotments to non-Indians so as to realize a subsistence income.7 8 The 1906 Burke Act enlarged this landless In76 McLaughlin graphically describes the rise of a new "ranching class," born of
allotment and related federal policies, on the Fort Berthold Reservation:
[T]he government "patronage system" rewarded this incipient private sector through the provision of unsecured reimbursable loans and by utilizing
proceeds from tribal land sales for the establishment of demonstration
farms and for the purchase of high-grade livestock. Such practices were
frequently protested by older traditional leaders, who regarded such use of
tribal funds as inequitable and whose formal influence and ability to redistribute goods were undermined by the emergent agrarian entrepreneurs.
Initially, ranchers organized economic labor and galvanized support within
indigenous social institutions such as kinship groups, using their skills and
relative wealth to become prominent leaders. Under pressure to assimilate
and increasingly invested in market exchange, by the 1920s and 1930s agrarian entrepreneurs had begun to disengage partially from such social and
moral networks and associated responsibilities. As the child of a successful
Fort Berthold rancher recalled, "My father wasn't much of a 'pow-wower';
he regarded dances and give-aways as a waste of time and money."
Id. at 107-08.
77 Id.
78 Some of the successful Indian ranchers on Fort Berthold exploited the Burke
Act to avoid BIA regulation of their grazing practices according to McLaughlin.
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dian class by issuing so-called "forced fee patents" to those
Indians who were deemed by a federal commission competent to
manage their own affairs.7 9 Ironically, it was the better-educated, half-blood or less tribal members who received these
forced fee patents from the federal competency commissions.
Once freed of trust status, those lands became taxable and most
of those lands were lost to Indian ownership for failure to pay
county or state property taxes. 80
Despite the federal government's formal repudiation of Indian
allotment in 1934, the damage had already been done."' Allotment, along with other introduced federal laws designed to disrupt tribalism in the late nineteenth-century such as the Indian
Major Crimes Act of 1886,82 was intended to resymbolize a new
Indian ideal: the white man's Indian. 3 Thus, the very idea of
"Indianness" became a contested meaning that embodied the legal and administrative needs of the federal government, rather
84
than the cultural survival requirements of the Indian peoples.
By seeking to take jurisdiction not only over the Indians' lands
but over their personal conduct as well, the federal government
They converted their trust-patent lands to fee-patent status and led the agency superintendent to charge that at least forty "of the more intelligent and thrifty Indians" were avoiding the reservation-wide cattle round-ups and working their stock
without agency supervision. Id. at 108.
79 Congress established so-called "competency commissions" to assess whether
one-half blood or less Indian allottees were sufficiently assimilated to be required to
accept a "forced fee-patent." See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2001). Thousands of such patents
were issued to Indians, and many lost their allotted lands for non-payment of county
or state property taxes. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 174.
80 Id.
81 Section one of the Indian Reorganization Act states: "No land of any Indian
reservation ... shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian." 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2001).
82 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
83 Army Captain Richard Henry Pratt, a key architect of federal Indian education
in the 1880s, advocated the "killing of the Indian, so as to save the man inside."
DAVID

H.

DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST:

A

HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION IN

116 (1993).
Mr. Thomas Morgan, Indian Commissioner from 1889 to 1893, was also convinced
that compulsory federal schooling would "turn the American Indian into the Indian
American." Clyde Ellis, 'A Remedy for Barbarism': Indian Schools, The Civilizing
Program and the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, 1871-1915, 18 AMER. INDIAN CULTURE & REs. J. 85 (1994).
84 Democracy was defined as a "caste system" organized by European conceptions of race in late nineteenth-century America. Those Americans with virtually
any degree of African or Asian ancestry were defined by local law as "colored" and
subjected to various legal disabilities due to their status. Not surprisingly, the federal government likewise began to "grade" Indian peoples according to their degree
of Indian blood. JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 309.
THE UNITED STATES
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sought to end tribalism forever. But allotment did not succeed in
destroying tribalism. It merely shifted the focus of the contest
from the external world to the internal life-worlds of the Indian
peoples. In that forum, any federal policy will always be doomed
to defeat.8 5
5.

Rebirth

Killing the tribe proved difficult, despite the federal government's best efforts. The Indian peoples themselves survived the
Indian allotment era that stretched from the 1880s to the 1920s.
Public revulsion against the allotment era's results spurred federal studies such as the 1928 Merriam Report that found that the
Indian peoples were, by far, the most isolated and impoverished
American minority.8 6 But the rebirth of the tribe is associated
with one man: Indian Commissioner John C. Collier." Reviving
tribalism was to be achieved through the implementation within
Indian Country of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of
1934.88 The IRA, as viewed by Collier and Interior Secretary
Harold Ickes, was a logical extension of proven Progressivist
principles of participatory democracy into Indian Country.8 9
Collier's opportunity to revive tribalism came on the heels of
those twin evils of the early 1930's, the Great Depression and the
Dust Bowl in the American midwest. Collier's "Indian New
Deal," like President Roosevelt's "American New Deal," generally promised the revitalization of Indian Country through federal economic and technical assistance to the devastated tribal
communities.
Collier's social re-engineering of Indian Country sought to
resymbolize tribes as constitutional democracies, entitled to a
measure of home rule on their respective reservations. By this
85 Alexis de Tocqueville concluded in 1848 that "[n]evertheless, the Europeans
have not been able to change the character of the Indians entirely." Id. at 310.
86 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 192-94.
87 John Collier was active from 1916 on in the National Community Center movement. Professor Kevin Mattson argues that the organization "always remained committed to community-based democracy."
KEVIN MATrSON, CREATING A
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC: THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

67 (1998).
According to Professor Jennings, Collier, later president of the American Indian
Defense Association, was "overwhelmed in a mystical way by the rituals of the
Pueblo Indians functioning in worship of nature." JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 388.
88 Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
89 JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 388-89.
DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
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device, he hoped to make tribalism's revival palatable to the
American public. Collier was convinced newly created tribal institutions-tribal constitutions, tribal business councils and an
awakened tribal electorate-would eventually emancipate the
Indian peoples from their dependence on the federal government.9" He had worked to empower other fragmented American
minorities-such as the Irish and the Italians in New York, Chicago, Boston and elsewhere-by a strategy of emancipatory
politics that organized these groups into political, economic and
cultural forces within the larger American society.9"
However, Collier failed to recognize that, unlike the ethnically
new and solid immigrant groups, the Indian peoples had adapted
their own strategies to deal with their wardship status under federal administration. Convincing the Indian peoples that tribal
home rule was a preferable alternative to BIA control was Collier's biggest challenge in selling the IRA to Indian Country. A
tradition of passive Indian resistance to BIA administration had
defined a leadership tradition within Indian Country. These
home-grown Indian leaders were skeptical of Collier's promise
that if they assumed the burdens of tribal decision-making, their
decisions would be respected by the federal government.9 2
Collier presumed that many Indians, particularly the more assimilated mixed-bloods, would eagerly embrace the IRA.9 3 This
view was more than naive. He did not grasp that, as a result of
the Indian allotment programs and a lengthy period of BIA-rule,
an interlocking set of interests ruled contemporary Indian Country. Those non-Indian farmers and ranchers who leased Indian
lands constituted one such interest group. They knew their Indian allottees and the BIA very well. They also knew how to
spread disinformation about the effect of the IRA on the allottees' interests and thereby undermine Collier's efforts to sell the
IRA within Indian Country. This influential interest group did
not support Collier's goal of enhancing tribal decision-making if
90

Id.

91 Id.

92 The IRA's structure of tribal constitutions and elected tribal officials conflicted
with the traditions of many, if not most, tribes in which government has been almost
wholly hereditary. Id. at 388-89.
93 Collier described this group of Indians as "mixed blood with a white-plus psychology." GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALIsM 52 (1980).
It is true that younger Indian men of mixed-blood ancestry
predominated on the new tribal councils. Id. at 51.
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it threatened their economic interests.9 4
Ironically, many full-blood tribal leaders also distrusted the
IRA's system of representative, elected tribal councils governed
by written tribal constitutions. They feared that traditional clanbased decision-making would be eclipsed by these over-strong
tribal institutions. 95 But Collier's instinctive judgment that his
IRA would be supported by the better-educated, assimilated tribal members proved to be true on some of the reservations.
They grasped the potential economic and social value of the tribal offices created by the IRA, and they welcomed a voice, however small, in their own affairs.96
Collier also underestimated the BIA's resistance to the IRA.
Through its "back channel" contacts in Congress, the BIA actively sought to undermine and limit its implementation. 97 Finally, Collier overestimated his personal ability to persuade
recalcitrant tribes such as the Navajo and the Crow to accept the
IRA. 98 The Navajo sheep herders were outraged by his heavyhanded efforts to reduce their herds within the carrying capacity
of their rapidly deteriorating range. The Crow feared that the
IRA would undermine their traditional governance based on a
general council system.
Assessing the IRA as an overall success or failure is not yet
possible. Many IRA tribes are now remaking their constitutions
and governments to better fit their evolving needs and their new
understandings of themselves as Indian peoples.9 9 Tribal home
rule, at least as envisioned by Collier, still has not been realized
on many Indian reservations. Collier's IRA applied a "lowest
common denominator" approach for the political development
of indigenous peoples from the Arctic Circle to the American
southwest. Stock tribal constitutions were presented to guide the
political development of radically divergent Indian societies. 1°°
Not surprisingly, some critics of the IRA liken Collier to Congressman Dawes: one sought to colonize tribalism with the idea
94 Not surprisingly, non-Indian farmers and ranchers that leased Indian allotments
resisted their displacement by the tribal land consolidation and cooperative efforts
spurred by the IRA. Id. at 125.
95 Id. at 39-62.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.

at 149.
at 33, 128-29.
99 JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 150.
100 Id. at 39-62.
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of individual property rights, while the other sought to colonize it
with the idea of constitutional democracy. Neither understood
the depth and pervasiveness of Indian resistance to their initia1
tives for the benefit of the Indian peoples. 1
Collateral IRA provisions, such as those establishing Indian
hiring and promotion preferences within the BIA, have had the
most impact. 10 2 These provisions helped leverage the creation of
a new Indian professional class: the Indian bureaucrat. Collier
certainly would have applauded the creation of this new class. It
notched perfectly into Collier's vision that his IRA would recip3
rocally transform both the tribes and the federal government.'
The tribes, as they gained power and experience under the IRA,
would demand more and better performance from the BIA. The
BIA, as it progressively became more "Indianized," would respond more sensitively to the tribes' demand for an enlarged decision-making role. 10 4 This hope likewise remains to be fully
realized within Indian Country.
I
THE FAILED EFFORT TO EMANCIPATE THE

AMERICAN INDIAN PEOPLES

Federal Indian law has just emerged from its most recent dark
age-the 1950s and early 1960s-when tribes were required to
bear burdens, not exercise sovereign powers.' 0 5 During that era
101 Id.
102 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). Professor David Williams has become somewhat exercised over what he views as the potential hypocrisy of the Mancari decision's "tying [employment] benefits to this kind of racial calibration [of onefourth or more Indian blood that] has historically been associated with racism at its
most despicable ....

GETCHES ET AL., supra note 45, at 243.

103 Taylor, supra note 92, at 39-62.
104 Id.

105 Professor Getches dates this "dark age" of Indian law from 1945 to 1961. He
describes this era as follows:
A turnaround in congressional policy toward Indians resulted in the dramatic departure from the reforms spearheaded by John Collier that began
in the early 1940s. There were calls from Capitol Hill to repeal the IRA
and to move away from the encouragement of tribal self-government as
official federal policy. Collier, Commissioner of the BIA since 1933, resigned in 1945 ....

In 1949, the Hoover Commission issued its Report on

Indian Affairs, recommending an about-face in federal policy: "complete
integration" of the Indians should be the goal so that Indians would move
"into the population as full, taxpaying citizens."
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 204.
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many tribes were terminated by federal action, °6 some were subjected to state jurisdiction under Public Law 280,107 and still
others had their members relocated to urban areas such as Denver, Chicago and the California Bay Area. 10 8 Since that time
tribes have sought to ride the crest of larger, potentially emancipating movements such as the American civil rights revolution of
the 1960s and a series of pro-tribal judicial decisions in the 1970s
to a new era of tribal self-determination."0 9
A.

The Origin of Tribal Self-Determination

Self-determination was introduced into the Indian Country
lexicon by President Richard Nixon's 1970 Indian Message to
Congress. 10 He modified the phrase "self-determination," however, by adding tribal as an adjective. Nixon clearly sought a new
foundation for federal Indian law and policy.1 1 That phrase has
been extended to include several sub-areas of tribal endeavor:
tribal environmental self-determination;" 2 tribal cultural self-de106 Termination of tribal status was, for Senator Arthur V. Watkins who led the
pro-termination forces in 1953 in Congress, the means of "end[ing] the status of
Indians as wards of the government and grant[ing] them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship." Id. at 204-5.
107 This federal jurisdictional transfer statute, enacted in 1953, sought to grant the

United States' criminal and civil jurisdictional responsibilities within Indian Country
to the states. Professor Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, the leading scholar on Public
Law 280, charitably characterized this statute's intent as a "compromise between
wholly abandoning the Indians to the states and maintaining them as federally protected wards, subject to only federal or tribal jurisdiction." Id. at 488. See also Pub.
L. No. 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
108 The BIA recognized the "economic carrying capacity" of the Indian reservations would not provide suitable job opportunities for many young Indian men and
women, especially those trained in vocational and clerical skills at off-reservation
boarding schools. The BIA developed the relocation program in the 1950s and
1960s as a means to get these Indian people to the supposed job opportunities within
America's urban centers. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 204-24.
109 Professor Getches credits the Supreme Court of the late 1960s and 1970s with
becoming the "defender of Indian rights," and it was required to "decide the extent
to which residual legislation from an earlier era of policy should be enforced and the
degree to which contemporary policy should inform interpretation and application
of law." Id. at 233-34.
110 President Nixon's major goal in promoting tribal self-determination was "to
strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community." Id. at 227.
1i1Id. at 226-28.
112 See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination, 21 VT. L. REV. 225 (1996).
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termination;1 3 and tribal economic self-determination." 4 This
new phraseology suggests that a fundamental paradigm shift in
federal Indian law has occurred.
But beyond relatively bland assertions, legal commentators
have offered remarkably little insight into the basic character,
process and purpose of tribal self-determination. What is needed
is a critique that renders tribal self-determination comprehensible, useful and, most importantly, adaptable to the needs of the
American Indian people. Thirty years have passed since the formal initiation of the tribal self-determination era, so we must
now step back and take stock of the tribal progress made under
its banner. To do so, we must examine both the self-determination and tribal components of Nixon's famous phrase.
1.

Evaluating the Self-Determination Component

Self-determination arguably encapsulates a distinct people's
inherent right to self-governing status. This right ostensibly derives from the contemporary interpretation of emerging international, human rights and indigenous peoples' law. 1 5 Read
together, they hold that those core attributes of a culture-language, religious beliefs and practices, as well as the distinctive
socio-economic arrangements-deserve respect under domestic
and international law." 6 Indeed, modern European history, beginning in the sixteenth century, if not earlier, is largely a recounting of the struggles of distinct peoples to achieve selfdetermining status. 1 7 This struggle continues today as indigenous peoples the world over assert their inherent and human
right to self-determination.""
But a distinct people's inherent rights may be denied to them.
These rights may be held in "trust" for them by a more powerful,
colonizing nation." 9 Such was the experience of many of the in113 See Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes,
Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145 (1996).
114 See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes:
From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251 (1995).

115 Professor James Anaya argues that "human beings, individually and as groups,
should be in control of their own destiny and that structures of government should
be devised accordingly." S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1991).
116 Id.
117 Id.

118 Id.
119 George W. Shepard, Jr., The Power System and Basic Human Rights: From
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digenous peoples of sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.12 0 The
European trusteeship over those indigenous peoples was de121
scribed by Rudyard Kipling as the "white man's burden.'
Later, worn down by the burdens of colonial administration and
bankrupted by the horrendous costs of World War II, most of
these European colonial nations during the 1950s and 1960s acceded to the demands of these indigenous peoples and restored
122
their self-determining status.
Should President Nixon's 1970 Indian Message be read as restoring self-determining status to the Indian peoples? That depends on how one reads the "tribal" adjective that modifies selfdetermination. That modifier renders ambiguous the nature,
scope and purpose of tribal self-determination.
2.

Evaluating the 'Tribal' Component

I seek to measure the contemporary tribe's potential for realizing self-determination against the background constraints of federal Indian law. I do so by focusing on the three most prominent
tribal strategies for realizing self-determination. First, tribes
have sought to "morph" their inherent and reserved treaty rights
into tribal police powers throughout Indian Country. 23 Second,
tribes have sought both economic control over their lands and to
use their competitive advantages so as to rebuild their tribal
economies. 124 Third, tribes have sought to reassert their cultural
identities as distinct peoples by securing constitutionally and statTribute to Self-Reliance in HUMAN RIGHTS

AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT

13-

25 (George W. Shepard & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1985).
120 Kipling spoke of the Indian as "half savage and half child"-the former requiring civilization and the latter socialization. ASHIs NANDY, TRADITIONS, TYRANNY
AND UTOPIAS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AWARENESS 58 (1987).
121 Id.
122 Id.

123 Tribes have naturally sought in the contemporary era, in Professor Getches'
view, to "increase the reach and sophistication of their own governmental powers
over Indian Country." GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 556. But their efforts to

achieve reservation development and self-sufficiency has brought them into direct
conflict with the "states [who] continually seek to assert their jurisdictional power
over Indian Country." Id. at 556.
This tribal versus state battle over "which government entity gets to receive a
stream of tax revenues or apply its land use ordinance on the reservation" will hinge
"on the jurisdictional principles of federal Indian law in an effort to resolve these
intense, high-stakes cross-cultural conflicts." Id. at 556-57.
124 Stephen Cornell advocates for tribes to assert "de facto sovereignty" as their
means of achieving economic development within Indian Country. Id. at 721 (citing
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utorily protected rights to the free exercise of their religious and
social practices." 5
I analyze these tribal strategies for self-determination within
two alternative contexts. First, I critique these strategies against
the backdrop of what I call the standard development model for
Indian Country. I conclude that this model holds promise only
for that minority of tribes who view wealth creation and accumulation as the essential feature of their quest for self-determination. Second, I critique these strategies against the backdrop of
what I call the transcendent model of tribal self-determination. I
conclude that this approach likely holds greater promise for the
majority of tribes who view cultural and social revitalization as
the essential feature of their quest for self-determination.
B.

My Critique of the Standard Model of
Tribal Self-Determination

Tribal efforts to transform their inherent and treaty-reserved
powers into practical means for the realization of their self-determination goals occasioned most of the Indian litigation of the
past thirty years.126 The working thesis that informs this tribal
Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country Today, 5
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 5, 5-13 (1997)).

His recommendation stems from a Harvard study of the marketplace performance
of over seventy-five tribes with significant forest-based resources. This study's results lead Cornell to conclude that sovereignty is the primary development resource
a tribe possesses. But this sovereignty must be guided by institutional structures that
ensure the separation of politics from business, an effective professional tribal bureaucracy and the constitutional separation of tribal governmental powers. Id. at
723-25.
125 In 1921, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommended the continuing suppression of traditional American Indian religious and cultural practices:
The sun-dance, and all other similar dances and so-called religious ceremonies are considered "Indian offences" under existing regulations, and corrective penalties are provided. I regard such restriction as applicable to
any dance . . . which involves the reckless giving away of property . . .

frequent or prolonged periods of any celebration ... in fact any disorderly
or plainly excessive performance that promotes superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idleness, danger to health, and shiftless indifference to family
welfare.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 754 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 175 (1992)).
Contemporary Indian religious practitioners have invoked the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment as a means of preserving their cultural and ceremonial access to sacred sites on the public lands. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
12 6

See

GETCHES ET AL.,

supra note 11, at 556-620.
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strategy conceives of contemporary tribes as legitimate American governments, akin to non-Indian local and state governments. Therefore, denying a tribe the right to exercise a
particular governmental power must be justified by citation to a
specific treaty or statutory provision expressly limiting that
tribe's governmental authority.12 7 By this approach, tribes have
sought to persuade the federal courts, the executive branch and
Congress to set a place for them at the table of American
governance.
The tribes' efforts to transform themselves into fully-recognized American governments have bumped up against the juridical limits inherent in Chief Justice Marshall's concept of the
tribe. 2 Tribes naturally have asserted their inherent and treatyreserved powers as constitutive of their identity as legitimate
American governments. They contend these powers must be judicially reinterpreted in a manner that allows the Indian people
to cope with their radically altered environments, economies,
welfare needs and social goals.' 29 They also contend the ancient
and more recent organic documents-Marshall's Indian law decisions, treaties, agreements, executive orders and tribal constitutions or codes-serve as enabling legislation empowering tribal
governments to enact those "necessary and proper" ordinances
that will allow the Indian people to adapt to their substantially
changed circumstances. 3 °
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
responded in blunt terms to this tribal strategy for self-determination. Put simply, the Court now regards tribal governments as
constitutively different from, if not inferior to, state and local
governments.'
It is likely that tribes will not be allowed to exercise their governmental powers in a manner that competes
with, or ostensibly threatens, the constitutionally established
rights and powers of those governments or their citizens.'32
127 Id.
128 Marshall's concept of the tribe as a "domestic, dependent nation" has been
exploited by the modern Supreme Court to limit the governmental powers of Indian
peoples within Indian Country. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,

17 (1831).
129 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 531-55.
130 Id.
131Id.

132 The Seminole Tribe's suit against Florida to enforce the good faith negotiation
provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was dismissed on state
sovereign immunity grounds. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (5-4
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1.

The Limits of the Standard Model of Tribal
Self-Determination

Tribal efforts to "cash-in" their inherent and treaty-reserved
powers into the currency of recognized police powers within Indian Country have driven recent Indian litigation. The limits of
this approach to tribal self-determination are illustrated in these
following analytic sections.
a.

Limiting Tribal Regulatory and Adjudicatory Authority
Within Indian Country

The resymbolizing of tribes as sovereign authorities within Indian Country has attracted much attention from the courts, Congress, and state and local governments. The tribes' assertion of a
wide-range of police powers deemed essential to the realization
of their sovereign interests has generated a substantial non-Indian backlash.' 3 3
Tribal self-determination demands, from the tribes' viewpoint,
judicial endorsement of those tribally reserved police powers essential for the growth and maturation of self-sustaining American Indian societies.13 4 Tribes, from the late 1960s to the late
1970s, were somewhat successful in persuading the federal courts
to reinterpret their inherent and reserved sovereign powers so as
to meet their radically altered economic, environmental and cultural circumstances. An impressive string of pro-tribal judicial
decisions during this era commemorated the apparent success of
this strategy. 35 However, the Supreme Court's recent string of
decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This decision has crippled tribal efforts to develop gaming enterprises that require a negotiated tribal-state compact as a basis for
commencing operations. Some constitutional scholars, such as Professor Martha
Field, mistakenly minimize the significance of this decision for tribal economic
development:
Seminole is probably not of major significance in regard to federal-Indianstate relations. It is designed to be, and is, a major decision about the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and about federal-state relations, judicial and congressional. The decision obviously affect the IGRA. But the
scheme that replaces the one held unconstitutional in Seminole could

prove more advantageous to Native Americans rather than less.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 751 (citing Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case,
Federalism, and the Indian Common Cause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 3-4 (1997)).
Whatever "more advantageous scheme" Professor Field had in mind for Indian gaming has yet to materialize.
133 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 531-55.
134 Id. at 556-620.
135 Id.
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anti-tribal decisions had revived Chief Justice Marshall's view of
tribes as historically-determined entities severely limited in the
nature and scope of their reserved police powers within Indian
136
Country.
The Supreme Court's Response to the Tribes' Assertion of
Sweeping Police Powers Within Indian Country

b.

Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe13 7
revived Marshall's juridical concept of the tribe as a historicallydetermined American government whose inherent powers were
substantially altered upon its incorporation into the United
States. He revived Marshall's incorporation thesis by holding
that Indian tribes had been, early on in America's history,
divested of any inherent criminal jurisdiction they may have once
possessed over non-Indian defendants.1 3
A brief analysis of the facts and holdings of that decision will
demonstrate the substantial limit imposed by the Court on the
tribe's assertion of general police powers within Indian Country.
Suquamish tribal police arrested Mark David Oliphant, a nonmember, during the tribe's annual Chief Seattle Days celebration, and charged him with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting
arrest. They also arrested another non-member, David Belgarde,
after a high-speed chase along the reservation highways that ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal police vehicle. He was
later charged at arraignment with reckless endangerment and
139
damaging tribal property.
The Port Madison Reservation, wherein the Suquamish people
reside, is located across the Puget Sound from Seattle. It is a
checkerboard of tribal trust land, allotted Indian land, property
held in fee simple by non-Indians, and various roads and public
highways maintained by Kitsap County.1 4 Both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld tribal
criminal jurisdiction over these two non-member defendants.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
136 Tribal efforts to assert criminal and civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within
Indian country prompted the Supreme Court to substantially limit the circumstances
under which these asserted tribal police powers may be exercised. Id. at 531-55.
137 435 U.S. 191 (1978).

138 Id. at 208-11.
39

Id. at 194.
140 Id. at 192-93.
1
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tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-members in
these circumstances.
Rehnquist reasoned, as did Chief Justice Marshall earlier, that
Indian reservations are "part of the territory of the United
States" and that they "hold and occupy [the reservations] with
the assent of the United States," and concluded that "by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian
tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian
citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress."141
He likewise turned legal history on its head, citing dictum in a
famous pro-tribal Supreme Court14 2 decision that immunized tribal Indians from federal criminal jurisdiction, by arguing to allow
Indian tribes to criminally prosecute non-Indian defendants
would:
[I]mpose upon [non-Indian defendants] the restraints of an external and unknown code.... which judges them by a standard
made by others and not for them . . . [i]t tries them, not by
their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of
their land, but by ... a different race, according to the law of a
social state of which they have an imperfect conception. 4 3
His sketchy historical research regarding tribal criminal jurisdiction was calculated to create what he described as a uniform
judicial and congressional understanding that tribes had been
divested of any inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants who may violate their laws. 144 Tribes forever remain,
for Rehnquist, the wolf-child, treacherous and vengeful, seeking
to inflict cruelty on any non-Indian who may fall into their
grasp. 145 Allowing tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians who violate their laws would return America to the
unregulated tribal world, one lacking in reliable laws or procedures for the protection of the individual liberties of non146
Indians.
Given that the Oliphant decision dealt with the unique issues
141 Id. at 208-10 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571-72
(1846)).
142 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
143 Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (quoting Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)).
144Id. at 193.

145

Id. at 195.

146 1d. at

196.
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of individual liberty and lacked citation to reliable precedent,
most legal commentators thought that its effect was limited to
the criminal jurisdiction arena. t 47 They were soon proven wrong.
Within a few years, the Supreme Court demonstrated the virtually unbridled reach of the Oliphant rationale by substantially
limiting tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians
within Indian Country. 148 A brief analysis of the facts and holdings of that decision illustrates the substantial limit imposed on
the tribes' assertion of general regulatory powers within Indian
Country.
The Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United
States focused on the Crow tribe's effort to regulate duck hunting
and trout fishing by non-Indians on fee-owned lands within the
boundaries of the Crow Reservation. 149 The lower court had upheld tribal regulatory power as an incident of the inherent sovereignty of the Crow people.1 50 However, Justice Stewart rejected
that position by citing the Oliphant decision for the "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe
do
5
not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe."' '1
The Montana decision vitiates, but does not necessarily eliminate, tribal police power over non-Indians who reside within Indian Country. It does require a tribe to demonstrate, as the basis
for tribal regulation of non-Indian activity on non-trust lands,
that such activity "directly and substantially" burdens a triballyprotected interest. 152 Hidden behind the lines of the Montana
decision is President Washington's view of the Indian peoples as
innately vengeful "wolf-children," given at any moment to unpredictable and irrational action. Limited by the Montana and
Oliphant decisions, tribes can never mature into American governments worthy of being entrusted with general regulatory or
adjudicatory jurisdiction within their territories.153
Tribes, after these two Supreme Court decisions, have understandably sought different strategies for self-determination
147 GETCHES El AL., supra note 11, at 542-43.

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
547.
150 Id. at 550.
151 Id. at 565.
152 Id. at 548.
148

149 Id. at

153 Robert A. Williams. Jr.. The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L.
REv. 219, 273-74.
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within Indian Country. Some have embraced a tribal strategy of
administrative self-determination within Indian Country. Building internal administrative capabilities within tribal governments
and preferentially employing tribal members in relatively sophisticated and remunerative jobs is a practical extension of John
Collier's earlier idea of Indian home-rule within Indian Country.
But it took President Nixon's "jaw-boning" of Congress to finally

bring this vision to reality via the 1975 enactment of the Indian
Self-Determination Act (ISDA).
C.

Building Tribal Administrative Capabilities Within
Indian Country

The congressional response to President Nixon's 1970 Indian
Message was to enact the ISDA. 5 4 It authorized the tribes to
contract with the Secretary of the Interior for the direct tribal
administration of those federally-funded Indian benefit programs
presently run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or the Indian Health Service (IHS).1 55 As a result, the ISDA was significantly amended in 1988 and 1994 and is now popularly known as
the Tribal Self-Governance Act (TSGA). 1 56 Tribes, now by con154 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)-(n) (2001).
155 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 226-230.

156 Tadd Johnson describes the congressional intent motivating the 1988 amendments to the ISDA:
The new Title featured a planning grant phase for twenty tribes. The
twenty tribes were then to negotiate compacts with the Secretary of the
Interior. The tribes were allowed to "plan, conduct, consolidate, and administer programs, services, and functions" of the Interior Department that
were "otherwise available to Indian tribes or Indians." Under the terms of
the written agreements, tribes were authorized to "redesign programs, activities, functions or services and reallocate funds of such programs, activities or services." The agreement was to specify the services to be provided
under the agreement and the procedures to be used to reallocate funds. In
essence, the Self-Governance Demonstration Project allowed twenty Indian tribes to receive funds in a large block grant from the Secretary of the
Interior. It allowed the Demonstration tribes to move money among programs as well as the power to actually prioritize spending, as opposed to
the shadow prioritizing process that characterized the IPS. In general, SelfGovernance gave tribes the power to make choices and be responsible for
their choices.
Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governancefor Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1267-68 (1995).

He describes the 1994 amendments to the ISDA as "incremental self-governance"
that, "[w]hile 'grandfathering' all of the Demonstration tribes.., provides for participation of only twenty new tribes each year." Id. at 1270.
He describes the major changes wrought by the 1994 amendments as including
annually negotiated "funding agreements" between the Interior Department and the
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tract or compact, can stand in the shoes of the BIA and IHS, or
other Interior Department agencies, so as to administer on their
respective reservations most of the federally-funded Indian benefit programs.15 7
The ISDA's seeming assumption is that by baby-steps, tribes
can move towards self-determination. It carries out this assumption by providing financial incentives to those tribes that are willing to departmentalize and professionalize their staffs and
administrative structures. Tribal self-determination, by this reckoning, will grow out of an increasingly sophisticated, rationalized
tribal bureaucracy.15 8 Some tribes have taken this development
path by opting to virtually take over the BIA's and IHS's programs on their reservations. This approach has quickly yielded
visible evidence of tribal self-determination, according to its advocates, by the increased employment of tribal members,
through tribal preferences for hiring and promoting tribal members into tribal administrative and staff positions.
Furthermore, these ISDA advocates argue that by empowering
tribes to design and develop their own reservation programs, better quality goods and services will be delivered to the Indian peoples. Moreover, individual tribal members will be spurred to
educationally and professionally invest in their talents and gain
the required degrees or skills certifications that will enable them
to take advantage of these enlarged tribal employment
59
opportunities.1
But the ISDA, despite its admittedly positive influences in incrementally adding tribal jobs and administrative capabilities,
cannot serve as an adequate approach to tribal self-determination. The reason is threefold. First, tribal self-determination fails
Self-Governance tribes that contemplate that "all [DO[] programs are eligible for
tribal administration under the funding agreement .... IId. at 1270-71. Tribes thus

have the opportunity to assume control of "non-BIA activities on or near their reservations." Id. at 1272.
157 Id.
158 Some legal commentators see the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975 as
initiating a process of "tribalization." He describes it as follows:
"Tribalization," as coined herein, refers to the process by which resources
dedicated to administering and implementing Indian programs are removed from the Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel and placed directly in
the hands of tribal governments. The tribal governments then have authority to perform tasks formerly reserved for the Federal trustee.
Id. at 1252.
159 Id.
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to define a core set of legal attributes that places tribes on par
with other recognized American governments. 16' The ISDA, by
this reckoning, contributes almost nothing to the growth of tribes
as self-determining entities. Instead, the ISDA expressly limits
tribes to administering narrowly defined statutory functions.
These statutory limitations require the tribes to deliver the same,
or similar, bundles of goods and services as the IHS or BIA
16 1
would have provided to eligible Indian beneficiaries.
Second, this new relationship between ostensibly self-determining tribes and federal government has produced troubling ev162
idence of federal intrusion into internal tribal decision-making.
Some western congressmen, such as former Senator Slade Gorton, have sought to punish those tribes who exercise their treaty
reserved rights by refusing them their self-determination funding. 1 6 Viewed in this light, the ISDA serves to potentially constrain, rather than promote, tribal self-determination. Most
tribes do have a fairly realistic view of the ISDA's promise and
process. They do not view it as the royal road to self-determination. They do view it as an instrument to promote tribal employ16 4
ment and development within Indian Country.
Tribal administrative development cannot be meaningfully
equated with tribal self-determination. For this reason, tribes
have understandably sought out other subject matter areas for
the meaningful expression of their peoples' power and identity.
Tribes have successfully built on the largely anecdotal evidence
of their wise stewardship of their lands and resources as the basis
for asserting exclusive jurisdiction over environmental resources
within Indian Country. Surprising allies have rallied in support
of their efforts, including President Reagan in 1983 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1984. Will the tribe enjoy success in building an ethic of tribal environmental selfdetermination?

160 Id.
161 Id.

162 Professor Getches cites efforts by some western congressmen to legislatively
curtail tribes' inherent and treaty-reserved powers as evidence of a non-Indian backlash against tribes' self-determination efforts. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at

152.
163 Id. at 739-42.

164 Johnson, supra note 113, at 1278-79.
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Tribes as States Under Federal Environmental Statutes

Resymbolizing "tribes as states" (TAS) is the new and highlytouted approach to enhancing tribal authority over environmental resources located within Indian Country. 65 It was another
Republican President, Ronald Reagan, who spurred the development of this approach. It was his 1983 Indian Policy Statementdirecting all federal executive agencies, not just the Interior Department, to develop government-to-government relationships
with those tribes within their respective jurisdictions-that effectively launched the TAS era.1 66 Two tribal self-determination
strategies derived from President Reagan's directive merit
assessment.
1.

The Administrative Origin of the TAS Strategy

Some executive agencies responded more fulsomely than
others to President Reagan's 1983 Indian Policy Statement. The
EPA promulgated its 1984 Indian Environmental Policy (IEP) as
a means of redefining its relationship with tribes throughout the
United States.' 6 7 Administrator William Riley's 1991 restatement of the IEP policy clearly addresses tribal environmental
self-determination:
The Agency will, in making decisions on program authoriza165 Congress amended several federal environmental statutes to enable the EPA

to treat tribes as states for the purposes of administering the following program
functions: (1) Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988) (the
EPA may treat tribes for all programs contained in statute); (2) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(Supp. IV 1992) (the EPA may enter into cooperative agreements with tribes to
carry out the Superfund's purposes); (3) Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988) (the EPA may treat tribes as for most regulatory purposes); and, (4) Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671g (1990) (the EPA may treat tribes as states for the
purposes of the Act).
The Clean Water Act's TAS amendment enables tribes to assume regulatory control over reservation water sources for specific program purposes. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (1988). They may qualify for grants for pollution control programs or construction of treatment facilities. They may also act to establish water quality standards and assume the implementation of a permit system to enforce those standards.
But the Act requires the applicant tribal government to possess a governing body
that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers, and limits any tribe's
assumed functions to the management of water resources "within the borders of an
Indian reservation" owned by, or held in trust for, a tribe or individual Indian. See
John L. Williams, The Effect of EPA's Designation of Tribes as States on the Five

Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, 29
166 Id. at 346.
167

TULSA

L.J. 345, 347-51 (1993).

Id.
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tion and other matters where jurisdiction over reservation pollution sources is critical, apply federal law as found in the U.S.
Constitution, applicable treaties and statutes and federal Indian law. Consistent with the EPA Indian Policy and the interest of administrative clarity, the Agency will view Indian
reservations as single administrative units for regulatory purposes. Hence as a general rule, the agency will authorize a
tribe or state government to manage reservation programs
only where that government can demonstrate adequate jurisdiction over pollution sources throughout the reservation.
Where, however, a tribe cannot demonstrate jurisdiction over
one or more of the reservation sources, the Agency will retain
enforcement primary for those resources. Until EPA formally
authorizes a state or tribal program, the Agency retains full
responsibility for program management. Where the EPA retains such responsibility, it will carry out its duties in accor1 68
dance with the principles set forth in the EPA Indian policy.
This pragmatically-based EPA policy thus favors tribal environmental self-determination for sound administrative and regulatory reasons. While it does contemplate the eventual tribal
administration of most, if not eventually all, reservation-based
environmental programs, it does so to promote the overriding
federal environmental interests embodied in the governing environmental laws. While the EPA's Indian policy does promote a
tribal voice in determining the future environmental character of
their tribal homelands, it does so as a strategy to achieve the
169
overarching goals of federal environmental law.
Congress statutorily ratified and extended EPA's Indian policy
via its enactment in 1987 of several TAS amendments to the major environmental statutes. Indian tribes, like states, are to work
cooperatively with the EPA to accomplish the federally-established environmental goals. 170 The TAS amendments authorized
168

Id.; see

Federal, Tribal and State Roles in the Protection of the Reservation En-

vironment, A Concept Paper Accompanying A Memorandum from Mr. William
Reilly, Administrator, EPA (July 10, 1991).

169 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals used this rationale to uphold an Indian
pueblo's ceremonial use designation of Rio Grande waters as against an Establishment Clause challenge by the city of Albuquerque. The court concluded the "EPA's
purpose in approving the designated use is unrelated to the Isleta Pueblo's religious
reason for establishing it" and that such a designation "serves a clear secular purpose: promotion of the goals of the Clean Water Act." City of Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428 (10th Cir. 1996).
170 The EPA's statement is explicit in this regard:
The Agency will, in making decisions on program authorization and other
matters where jurisdiction over reservation pollution sources is critical, apply federal law as found in the U.S. Constitution, applicable treaties, statutes and federal Indian law. Consistent with the EPA Indian Policy and the
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the EPA to promote-through the provision of grant assistance
and technical support-the tribal governments' development of
their administrative capabilities to regulate reservation-based en1 71
vironmental resources.
2.

EPA's Adoption of the "Direct and Substantial" Effect Test
As the Regulatory Basis for Awarding TAS Status

Given the tribes' role in carrying out federal environmental
policy within Indian Country, the EPA's recent interpretive rule
implementing section 518(e) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) appears all the more puzzling.1 72 It fundamentally undermines the
TAS approach to tribal environmental self-determination. It
does so by expressly incorporating the "second prong" of the
Montana test into the basis for tribal regulation of non-Indian
activities that affect the reservation's waters. The EPA characterized that decision as allowing the tribe to regulate non-member conduct on fee lands within the reservation only173if that
conduct has a direct effect on tribal health and welfare.
interests of administrative clarity, the agency will view Indian reservations
as single administrative units for regulatory purposes. Hence as a general
rule, the agency will authorize a tribal or state government to manage reservation programs only where that government can demonstrate adequate
jurisdiction over pollution sources throughout the reservation. Where,
however, a tribe cannot demonstrate jurisdiction over one or more reservation sources, the agency will retain enforcement primacy for those sources.
Until EPA formally authorizes a state or tribal program, the agency retains
full responsibility for program management. Where EPA retains such responsibility, it will carry out its duties in accordance with the principles set
forth in the EPA Indian policy.
Raymond Cross, When Brendale Met Chevron: The Role of the FederalCourts in the
Construction of an Indian Environmental Law, 1 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES
J. 1, 11 (1996) (on file with author).
171 Williams, supra note 165, at 346-47.
172 The EPA's interpretive rule permits a tribal applicant to demonstrate that it
has jurisdiction over non-members' activities on fee lands by showing that their activities on those lands may imperil the tribe's political integrity, economic security,
or health and welfare in a serious and substantial manner. The EPA's rule further
presumes that tribal applicants will generally be able to meet this standard. 40
C.F.R. §§ 131.1-.8 (2001) [hereinafter "EPA Rule"].
173 The EPA's interpretive rule inexplicably ignores the provision in section
518(e) that points out that the purpose of TAS status is to protect those "water
resources held by an Indian tribe ... [or] ... held by the United States in trust for

Indians." The statutorily recognized trust status of these water resources should effectively preclude the EPA's adoption of its "territorial analysis" that focuses on the
scope of inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee status lands within Indian Country. This federal trust duty to protect Indian waters from injury is, of
course, an independent obligation of the EPA and does not depend on the nature
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The EPA likewise incorporated the Supreme Court's 1989
holding in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation17 4 into its interpretive rule. That decision was
read by the EPA as holding that only the "direct and substantial"
impact of a non-member's activities on a protected tribal interest
will justify the tribal regulation of those activities on fee lands
within the reservation. Despite its characterization of the
Court's opinion in Brendale as "deeply splintered" and expressing no clear rule for determining the scope of inherent tribal
jurisdiction over non-members' activities, the EPA nonetheless
incorporated its holding into its interpretive rule.
A brief recounting of the factual structure underlying the
Court's deeply splintered holding in Brendale demonstrates why
the EPA was mistaken in its action. The Yakima Indian Reservation is located in the southeastern part of the state of Washington. Of the 1.3 million acres of reservation land, approximately
80% is held in federal trust status on behalf of the Yakima Nation or individual tribal members. The remaining 20% is owned
in fee by Indian or non-Indian landowners. Most of the fee land
is located in Toppenish, Wapato and Harrah, three incorporated
towns located in the northeastern part of the reservation.1 75
The parties and the lower courts regarded the reservation as
divided into "opened" and "closed" portions. The closed or "Indian" area of the reservation consists of the western two-thirds of
the reservation and is predominantly forest land. The overwhelming majority of the 740,000 acres of land in that area is
held in tribal trust. The open area of the reservation is primarily
rangeland, agricultural land, and residential and commercial
land. Almost half of the land in the open area is held in fee
status. 176
The Yakima Nation adopted its zoning ordinance in 1970 and
amended it to its present form in 1972. It applies to all lands
within the Yakima Indian Reservation including fee lands owned
by Indians or non-Indians. Yakima County adopted a compreand scope of inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian County.
This statutory provision recognizing the trust status of these reservation waters is
nowhere addressed in the EPA's rule making. Id.
174 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that Yakima Nation has zoning authority as to
lands owned by nonmembers of tribe in Yakima reservation's "closed area," but not
as such lands in reservations "open area").
175 Id. at 415.
176 Id. at 416.
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hensive zoning ordinance in 1972. That county ordinance applies
to all real property within the county boundaries, except for Indian trust lands. It established a number of use districts which
generally govern agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial,
and forest watershed uses. The particular zoning designations at
issue in this case are the forest watershed and general rural
designations.
A non-tribal member, Philip Brendale, owned a 160-acre parcel of land near the center of the closed area of the reservation.
It is zoned as a "reservation restricted" area by the Yakima Nation and as "forest watershed" by Yakima County. Brendale
submitted a subdivision proposal to Yakima County requesting
that he be allowed to divide his 20-acre parcel into ten 2-acre
summer cabin sites. However, the proposed subdivision was not
allowable under the Yakima Nation ordinance.1 77
Another non-tribal member, Stanley Wilkinson, owned a 40acre parcel of land in the open area of the reservation, on a slope
overlooking the county airport, less than a mile from the northern boundary of the reservation. The land is zoned as agricultural by the Yakima Nation and as general rural by Yakima
County. In 1983 Wilkinson applied to the county for permission
to subdivide 32 acres of his land into twenty lots for single family
homes. The Yakima Nation ordinance would not have allowed
this proposed subdivision.17 8
The Yakima Nation challenged both of these proposed developments in federal district court. It sought a declaratory judgment that the Yakima Nation had exclusive authority to zone the
properties in question and an injunction barring county approval
of any proposed developments inconsistent with the Yakima Nation's zoning ordinance. 17 9
A deeply divided Court upheld the Yakima Nation's power to
zone the Brendale's property while denying it the power to zone
the Wilkinson's property. The "swing opinion" of Justices Stevens and O'Connor distinguished between the "closed" and
"opened" areas of the reservation. The two justices reasoned
that the undeniably "Indian" character of the closed portion of
the reservation authorized the Yakima Nation to "prevent the
few individuals who own portions of the closed area in fee from
177
178

179

Id. at 418.
Id.
Id. at 419.
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undermining its general plan to preserve the character of this
unique resource .... "180 By the same token, they reasoned that
the Yakima Nation lacked the authority to regulate land use
within the open portion of the reservation. According to Stevens
and O'Connor, non-Indian use of the opened lands had "produced an integrated community that is not economically or culturally delimited by reservation boundaries."1 8' 1 This factor,
coupled with the tribe's lack of power to exclude non-members
from that area, caused the two justices to hold that the Yakima
Nation "lacks the power to define the essential character of the
territory. "182
Their swing opinion in Brendale has been criticized as establishing an undefinable and potentially racist test for when a portion of an Indian reservation has lost its "Indian character" and is
therefore beyond tribal regulatory control. 18 3 Nonetheless, the
EPA seized on the Brendale decision as modifying its rule-making powers under section 518(e) of the CWA. It extracted from
that decision the "substantial effect" test that it interpolated into
its final interpretive rule governing the administrative grant of
TAS status to applicant tribes.
Why the EPA chose to incorporate these fundamentally flawed
anti-tribal holdings as the basis for its TAS administration, I have
criticized elsewhere. 184 By its interpretive rule, a tribe that seeks
reservation-wide water quality jurisdiction must now meet an administrative version of the "direct and substantial" effect test.
180 Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 444.
182 Id. at 444-45.

183 Professor Joseph Singer has criticized the Brendale decision as establishing Indians as a disadvantaged "racial caste":
The Supreme Court has assumed in recent years that although non-Indians
have the right to be free from political control by Indian nations, American
Indians can and should be subject to the political sovereignty of nonIndians.
This [disparity] is not the result of neutral rules being applied in a manner
that has a disparate impact. Rather, it is the result of formally unequal
rules. Moreover, it can be explained only by reference to perhaps unconscious racist assumptions about the nature and distribution of both property and power. This fact implies an uncomfortable truth: both property
rights and political power in the United States are associated with a system
of racial caste.
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1991).
184 Raymond Cross, When Brendale Met Chevron: The Role of the Federal Courts
in the Construction of an Indian Environmental Law, 1 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J.
1 (1996).
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Non-Indian fee land owners, joined by state and local governments, have challenged the EPA's TAS designations under this
interpretive rule as arbitrary and legally invalid under the
185
Court's Montana and Brendale decisions.
The recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, albeit upholding the
EPA's TAS designation for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, illustrates the undermining of tribal authority to protect their reservation waters, as well as the EPA's expertise in
ensuring the wise administration of the environmental policies
embodied in the CWA.186 While upholding the challenged TAS
designation, the Ninth Circuit denied any Chevron deference to
the EPA's interpretative rule upon which the TAS designation
was based. 187 The court agreed with the appellant, the State of
Montana, on this point:
We agree with appellants insofar as they contend that the
scope of inherent tribal authority is a question of law for which
EPA is entitled to no deference. EPA's decision to adopt inherent tribal authority as the standard intended by Congress
may well be viewed in a deferential light because the statute's
language and legislative history were not entirely clear. [Citations omitted]. EPA's delineation of the scope of that standard, however, has nothing to do with its own expertise or
with any need to fill interstitial gaps in the statute committed
to its regulation. Therefore, EPA's delineation of the 1scope
of
88
tribal inherent authority is not entitled to deference.
Future federal district court judges may therefore engage in de
novo judicial review of the alleged adverse effects on non-Indian
governmental or economic interests occasioned by the EPA's future TAS designations. Given that on many of the Great Plains'
Indian reservations, non-Indian settlement and economic development has rendered the resident Indians a dispossessed minority within their own homelands, those judges will be sorely
tempted to disagree with the wisdom of the EPA's TAS designations. By giving the "direct and substantial" effect test of Montana and Brendale undue currency within the environmental
185 See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
186 The State of Montana opposed the EPA's granting of TAS status to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation to the extent that

such status would extend to reservation land and surface waters owned in fee by
non-members of the tribes. The EPA approved the tribe's application after determining that the tribes possessed inherent authority over non-members on fee lands.
Montana then sued the EPA over this allegedly illegal agency action. Id. at 1140.
187 Id.
188 Id.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 938 2000

Tribes as Rich Nations

arena, the EPA has rendered the TAS strategy of problematic

value to those many Indian people who reside in a deeply subordinated economic and land-owning status on their own
reservations. 189
The promise of the TAS strategy as a means for tribal environmental self-determination has been unduly compromised by the
EPA's interpretation of section 518(e) of the CWA. It is not surprising that many tribes have looked beyond the environmental

realm in their search for meaningful opportunities for tribal selfdetermination. It is also not surprising that some tribes have focused on the tribal cultural self-determination arena as the most

appropriate forum for expression of their peoples' identities and
interests. Can tribes realize cultural self-determination and build
an ethic of cultural heritage that will be respected and enforced
by the federal courts?
E.

Tribal Efforts to Build an Ethic of Cultural Heritage

Tribal cultural self-determination is the most recent forum of
conflict between Indians and non-Indians for control of new statutorily-denominated cultural resources called "cultural patrimony"' 9 ° and "traditional cultural properties."' 9' The new

conflicts range from competition over non-Indian recreational
and Indian cultural uses of public lands to a ferocious battle for
control of ancient human remains between non-Indian scientists
note 184.
190 Professor Dean Suagee characterizes cultural patrimony as "refer[ring] to objects which have such cultural importance that they are considered the inalienable
property of a tribe or group, not subject to ownership or alienation by individual
189 Cross, supra

members of the tribe or group." Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L.

REV. 145, 204 (1996): see also Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act (NAGPRA), Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3001(3)(D) (2001)).
191 "In carrying out [its] responsibilities under [section 106], a Federal Agency
shall consult with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that attaches
cultural or religious significance to" a property that is listed on or eligible for the
National Register. National Historic Preservation Act of 1996 § 106(d)(6), 16
U.S.C. § 470(d)(6) (2001). Professor Suagee points to the 1996 proposed rules requiring a federal agency to consult with the relevant tribe or Native Hawaiian organization in the identification of historic properties, assessment of adverse effects and
resolution of adverse effects, and, in the event of a failure to resolve adverse effects,
the tribe or Native Hawaiian organization would have the same opportunities as the
State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) to participate in the process through
which the Advisory Council would provide comments to the agency. See Saugee,
supra note 190, at 185.
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19 2
and culturally affiliated tribes.
These new cultural preservation concepts represent a remarkable departure from past historic preservation efforts that were
largely directed at protecting American Indian cultural resources
because of their utility to non-Indian scientific and aestheticallyinterested communities.' 93 None of these earlier preservation
laws provided for tribal participation in the identification, planning or administration of federal programs or projects that have
significant impact on American Indian cultural resources. 94
Only recently have public land managers come to grips with
their obligations to work and consult with affected American Indian communities in carrying out project-related activities affecting American Indian historic and cultural resources. Tribal
governments and Indian user groups had historically been
marginalized in agency-sponsored projects or planning activities
affecting their historic or cultural resources.

1.

The Impact of the Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n
v. Babbitt' 95 Decision on American Indian Cultural
Resources Law

Recent litigation has focused on a federal land manager's implementation of her newly imposed statutory preservation duty
to preserve the living cultures of contemporary American Indian
communities.' 9 6 In February 1995, the National Park Service issued its Final Climbing Management Plan (FCMP) for Devils
Tower in response to the tremendous increase in the rate of rec192 Bonnichsen v. United States, Dep't of Army, 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997).
193 Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower At The Crossroads:
The National Park Service and the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources in the 21st Century, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 5, 11-14 (1997).
194 Id. at 17.
195 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998). Judge William Downes granted an
injunction against the National Park Service forcing it to issue commercial climbing
permits.
196 Devils Tower was determined eligible for the National Register of Historic
Places as a traditional cultural property for its American Indian relationships. A
traditional cultural property is protected "because of its association with cultural
practices or beliefs of a living community that (a) are rooted in that community's
history and (b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity of the
community." Cross & Brenneman, supra note 193, at 9. The Superintendent of
Devils Tower took action to list Devils Tower in compliance with Congress' mandate
to preserve Native American cultural use of Devils Tower as a "historical, architectural or [site of] cultural significance at the community, state or local level." Id. at
17 n.47 (alteration in original).
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reational rock climbing and the corresponding need to protect
the site's resources from degradation. The FCMP included the
following provisions: no new bolts or fixed pitons will be allowed
on the tower; access trails are to be rehabilitated; camouflaged
climbing equipment will be required; and certain routes will be
closed seasonally to protect raptor nesting. It also discontinued
the award of commercial climbing licenses for the month of June
and encouraged recreational climbers to refrain from climbing
during June due to the cultural importance of this month to the
northern plains Indian tribes. No restrictions were imposed on
the general visiting public, who may continue to use the site even
during the month of June. Only commercial climbers that hold
revocable licenses granted by the Superintendent were
mandatorily restricted during the month of June under the
FCMP.'97 Superintendent Deborah Liggett was the moving
force behind the FCMP, and not surprisingly, her action provoked legal challenge,' 9 8 disrupting the climbing management
plan for Devils Tower one year into its operation.
This litigation, brought by several commercial and private rock
climbing interests, challenged the FCMP as a constitutionally
barred governmental establishment of religion in favor of American Indian religious users of Devils Tower. My analysis focuses
on the district court proceedings in which the court found for the
plaintiffs and granted an injunction against the implementation
of the June closure provision of the FCMP.' 99 The plaintiffs
claimed that the June commercial climbing closure constituted a
"subsidy of the Indian religion" and "an excessive governmental
entanglement with religion" in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Judge Downes agreed with the climbers in granting their
requested injunction, ruling that the prohibition of commercial
climbing during June violated the Establishment Clause. Superintendent Liggett's expressed intention to close Devils Tower to
all rock climbing, private and commercial, if voluntary private
compliance with the FCMP failed to significantly reduce noncommercial climbing, in Judge Downes' opinion, amounted to
197 Id. at 26.

198 "Superintendent Liggett's action was taken in compliance with Congress' mandate to preserve American Indian cultural use of Devils Tower as a 'historic, architectural or [site of] cultural significance at the community, state or local level.'" Id.
at 17 n.47 (alteration in original).
199 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn v. Babbit (D. Wyo. Jun. 1996) (order granting.
in part, Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction), at 11 (on file with author).
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government coercion of individual conduct in favor of American
Indian religious activities.2 °°
Because I have criticized elsewhere Judge Downes' reasoning
in this matter,20 1 I focus here on the impact of his decision on the
power of federal land managers to reasonably accommodate
American Indians' cultural uses of public lands. By characterizing the American Indians' cultural uses of Devils Tower as religious in character, and by distorting the religious accommodation
principle expressed in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n ,202 Judge Downes construed the June closure of Devils
Tower to commercial rock climbing as a violation of the Establishment Clause. By equating all American Indian cultural activities as religiously motivated conduct, he effectively abolished
land managers' authority to carry out their cultural preservation
duties expressed in statutes such as the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).2 °3
2.

Tribal Cultural Self-Determination After the Bear
Lodge Decision

Coupling Judge Downes' Bear Lodge decision, conflating all
American Indian cultural practices into religiously motivated be200 The National Park Service revised its climbing management plan and excised
its ban on commercial climbing before trial was held before Judge Downes. Given
that excision of the ban on commercial climbing, Judge Downes dismissed the climbers' lawsuit challenging the new "voluntary climbing ban" as coercive and an unconstitutional endorsement of Indian religious beliefs and practices. See Bear Lodge
Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998).
In a sad denouement of this matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the Park Service's reliance on the climbers self-regulation, a new educational program to motivate climbers to comply, and a sign that requests visitors to stay on the
trail around the Tower. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 173 F.3d
814, 819 (10th Cir. 1999).
201 See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 193, at 25-26.
202 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Scott Hardt argues that the Lyng decision discriminates

against Indian religious practitioners:
By focusing on the form of impact the challenged government action creates, rather than the impairment of religious exercise, the Court has drawn
a line that discriminates against American Indian religious practitioners.
As a result of the free exercise analysis developed by the Supreme Court,
persons practicing Western religious traditions are protected from even relatively minor burdens on their religious practices, while American Indians
are not protected from government action that essentially destroy religious
traditions.
Scott Hardt, The Sacred Public Lands: Improper Line Drawing in the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise Analysis, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 601, 657 (1989).
203 See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 193, at 33-39.
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liefs, with the Lyng Court's reduction of the religious accommodation command of the Free Exercise Clause to mere advisory
guidance, leaves federal land managers with very little incentive
or authority to preserve American Indians' cultural access to
their sacred resources and sites on public lands."z 4
But "baby steps" toward cultural self-determination may be
possible within the interstices of governing federal laws. For example, the 1992 "Indian" amendments to the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) require federal land management activities affecting "traditional cultural properties" to be "carried
out in consultation with the affected tribes. ' 20 5 Federal courts
have held that these procedural protections of American Indian
cultural resources must be scrupulously observed by federal land
managers.20 6 No doubt the lives of public land managers are
complicated by these new procedural duties, but faithful adherence to the tribal consultation requirements provides the Indian
peoples with an opportunity to influence federal project activities
that impact access to their traditional sacred sites. Only now are
federal land managers coming to grips with their obligations to
communities in
consult and work with affected American 20Indian
7
preserving traditional cultural properties.
Consultation with affected tribes likewise drives the cultural
preservation goals of the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 208 . Federal museums must
now inventory their American Indian collections and notify affected tribes of any human remains or artifacts derived from an
33-36
Id. at 18-19.
206 Stern and Slade describe the NHPA, as not an "action forcing" statute, but as
imposing procedural duties on the National Park Service (NPS) and similarly situated federal agencies to promote the preservation of identified cultural and historic
resources. They conclude that the federal courts have interpreted these duties as
mandatory in nature. See Walter E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and
204 Id. at
205

Cultural Resources and Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development: A
Practical Primer, 35 NAr. RESOURCES J. 133, 139-40 (1995).

207 Public land management agencies, particularly the National Park Service and
U.S. Forest Service, are seeking to develop genuine working relationships with affected Native American communities to identify and protect traditional cultural
properties. For example, Superintendent Liggett created a Devils Tower working
group that included affected Native American communities, representatives of the
recreational climbing community, local government, and economic interests. Her
actions represent one public land manager's effort to comply with the broadened
consultation requirement of the NHPA. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 193, at
18.
208 Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994)).
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affiliated tribal culture. Affected tribes may request their return
for appropriate tribal administration. Likewise, NAGPRA provides for the repatriation of "discovered" American Indian remains and associated artifacts found on federal lands to the
closest culturally affiliated tribe.20 9
While these new federal cultural preservation duties do contribute to tribal cultural self-determination, they do not forcefully establish an ethic of cultural heritage which will
authoritatively resolve disputes between non-Indian and tribal
interests in cultural resources.2 10 Understandably, some tribes
have looked beyond the realm of tribal cultural self-determination in an effort to locate entrepreneurial opportunities for the
meaningful expression of their peoples' talents and resources.
Can these entrepreneurial tribes lead their Indian peoples to the
promised land of economic self-determination?
F.

Tribes As Entrepreneurs

Fundamental to the economic sovereignty of any self-determining people is the exclusive ability to capture those economic
rents that derive from business transactions within its territory.
The tribes' power to capture these economic rents has been recently confirmed by the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.211
A brief recounting of the facts and holdings of that decision
displays its potential support for the tribe as entrepreneur. The
Jicarilla Apache Tribe imposed a severance tax on "any oil and
natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands."2'12
Non-Indian mineral lessees challenged the tribe's authority to
impose such a tax on their leasehold interests. The Jicarilla tribe
resides on a 742,315 acre executive order reservation in northwest New Mexico. That reservation was established for the
tribe's exclusive use and occupancy. The tribe leased about 89%
209 Professor Suagee characterizes NAGPRA as "establish[ing] a legal regime to
protect human remains and other cultural items located on tribal lands and federal
lands." Suagee, supra note 190, at 203
210 A forceful ethic of cultural heritage would "view cultural heritage as an issue
of cultural, ethnic, or in some cases minority rights, and as one of the keys to cultural
preservation and self-determination." Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 Az. ST. L.J. 291, 301 (1999). By that view, "the disposition of
cultural heritage should be determined exclusively by the source nations or culturally affiliated groups." Id.
211 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
2 12

Id. at 136.
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of their reservation for mineral development purposes. Since
1953 various non-Indian mineral lessees have leased, with federal
approval, those tribal lands.
In exchange for a cash bonus, royalties, and rents, the typical
lease grants the lessee "the exclusive right and privilege to
drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose of all oil and natural gas deposits in or under" the leased land for as long as the
minerals are produced in paying quantities.2 13
In 1968, the Jicarilla tribe revised its tribal constitution to provide that "[t]he tribal council may enact ordinances to govern the
development of tribal lands and other resources., 2 4 The council
later enacted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and
gas production on tribal land. That ordinance was approved by
the BIA in December 1976.
The non-Indian mineral lessees argued that their leaseholds
entitled them to enter the reservation and exempted them from
further tribal regulation. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for
the Court's majority, criticized that argument as failing to accord
an appropriate sovereign role to the Jicarilla tribe. Tribal governments, like other sovereigns, must unequivocally waive their
taxing authority within the governing leases or contracts, and Justice Marshall found nothing in the challenged tribal mineral
leases that demonstrated the Jicarilla tribe's intent to waive its
sovereign taxing authority. He concluded that the Jicarilla Tribe
had clearly retained its right to impose a severance tax on the
mineral leaseholds in question. 15
Capturing a share of those economic rents that derive from
reservation-based business activities, according to Justice
Thurgood Marshall, is simply an incident of a tribe's inherent
sovereign authority recognized by the Court in its 1832 decision
in Worcester v. Georgia.2 16 Chief Justice John Marshall had reasoned in his opinion in Worcester that the Cherokee peoples'
right of exclusive use and occupancy of their reserved lands left
no room for Georgia's exercise of regulatory authority within
their territory. Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion in Merrion
likewise sought to create a "growth space" for tribal economic
development by confirming tribal taxing authority over non-In213

Id. at 135.

214

Id.

Id. at 149-52.
216 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
215
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dian economic activity within Indian Country. Absent the power
to exclusively capture reservation-generated economic rents,
tribes that seek to follow the traditional economic development
path are likely doomed to failure.21 7
But the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation 218 has seemingly
destroyed the tribe's right to capture a fair share of those economic rents that derive from economic activity within Indian
Country. Instead of adhering to its Worcester doctrine barring
state intrusion into tribal economic life, Justice White's opinion
developed a preemption-based analysis that allows a state to tax
away virtually all reservation-generated economic rents unless
the affected tribe can demonstrate that those rents derive from a
tribally produced value. 2 19 He conceded that the Colville tribe
had an interest in generating revenues for essential government
activities; nonetheless he required that the "revenues [be] derived from value generated on the reservation involving the
Tribes . . . [and that] the taxpayer [be] the recipient of tribal
services."220
No doubt the Court's majority was influenced by the fact that
the tribal economic rents at stake derived largely from tribal
sales of untaxed cigarettes to non-Indians who likely traveled to
217 Professor Stephen Cornell considers the tribal exercise of de facto sovereignty
within Indian Country as essential to the economic development of the Indian
peoples:
In virtually every case that we have seen of sustained economic development on American Indian reservations, the primary economic decisions are
being made by the tribe, not by outsiders. In every case, the tribe is in the
driver's seat. In every case, the role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
and other outsider agencies has shifted from decision-maker to resource,
from the controlling influence in decisions to advisor or provider of technical assistance.
The logic of this is clear. As long as the BIA or some other outside organization carries primary responsibility for economic conditions on Indian reservations, development decisions will reflect the goals of those
organizations, not the goals of the tribe. Furthermore, when outsiders
make bad decisions, they don't pay the price, the tribe does.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 721-22 (citing Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prospering and Policy in Indian Country Today, 5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENI 5,5-7, 9-

13 (1997)).
218 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (holding valid the enforcement of Washington taxes as to
sales of cigarettes to non-Indian on reservation in state, but imposition on Indianowned vehicles held invalid).
219 Id. at 156-57.
220

Id.
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the Colville reservation to take advantage of those bargain
prices. 221 But, as recognized by the dissent, empowering the

state and tribe to both tax reservation-based economic activity
not only flies in the face of Worcester, but also renders problem-

atic the future success of tribal entrepreneurial activity that involves substantial "cross-border" non-Indian involvement or
financial participation.2 2
The dissent's remarks have proven prophetic. Only one recent
appeals court decision has disallowed state taxation of reservation-generated value because of its direct impact on tribal economic development opportunities. 223 In Crow Tribe v.
Montana22 an Indian tribe challenged Montana's application of
its 30% coal severance tax to non-Indian leaseholders of tribal
minerals. In 1972 the tribe leased to Westmoreland Resources
the right to mine tribally-reserved coal under the so-called ceded
strip of tribal land. In 1975 Montana imposed two taxes on all
coal producers. The first was a state severance tax "imposed on
each ton of coal produced in the state., 225 The rate varied from
3% to 30% of the coal's value, depending on the quality and
whether the mining was on the surface or underground. The second tax was a gross proceeds tax imposed on each person engaged in coal mining. The rate was determined by applying the
relevant county's property tax to the assessed value of the coal
producer's gross yield from coal contract sales. The amount
taxed varied by county and year.226
Between 1975 and 1982, Westmoreland paid $53,800,000 in
Id. at 155.
The dissent cites three reasons why Indian economic development will be undermined by this decision:
First, it means that in this case the sharp drop in cigarette sales that would
result from imposition of state tax will reduce revenues not only of individual Indian retailers, but also of the Tribes themselves as governmental
units. Second, it means that a decision permitting application of the state
tax would place Indian goods at an actual competitive disadvantage as
compared to non-Indian ones because the former would have to bear two
tax burdens while the latter bore but one. And third, it leads to an actual
conflict of jurisdiction and sovereignty because imposition of the Washington tax would inject state law into an on-reservation transaction which the
Indians have chosen to subject to their own laws.
Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223 Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 484 U.S. 997
(1988).
224 819 F.2d at 895.
225 Id. at 897.
226 Id.
221
222
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state severance taxes and $8,100,000 in state gross proceeds taxes
for its ceded strip mining operations. In 1976 the tribe imposed
its own severance tax of 25% for coal mined on the reservation.
In 1982 it enacted a similar tax for coal mined on the ceded strip.
The Department of Interior rejected the latter tax because the
tribal constitution had disclaimed tribal jurisdiction over the
ceded area. That same year Westmoreland agreed to pay the tribal tax but received credit for the coal taxes paid to Montana.
Hence it has paid no severance tax to the tribe.
Montana relied on the Colville decision as warrant for its taxation of non-Indian tribal mineral lessees, arguing that the Crow
tribe, as in the earlier case, sought to "market an exemption from
state taxation to persons who would normally do their business
elsewhere. 2 2 7 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding the "coal
is the Tribe's property, a natural resource. Its lease brings revenue that represents value generated by tribal activities .... 228
However, it was the appeals court's analysis of the Crow tribe's
economic impact study of the state taxes' effect on the reservation's coal-based economy that raised troubling analytical issues.
That report concluded that the state taxes prevented Crow coal
from competing with lower-taxed Wyoming coal and resulted in
far less Crow coal production than would otherwise have occurred. The court, over Montana's vehement objections, concluded that the state taxes had "at least some negative impact on
the coal's marketability. '229 Further, even assuming Montana
has a legitimate interest in taxing Crow coal, the court concluded
that these "high taxes affect tribal revenues [and] . . . burden[s]
the Tribe's interests in coal . . "230 The court also cited the

"federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development" as the basis for its preemption holding that Montana's tax was so large that it could not be applied to tribal leases
without interfering with tribal economic development.2 3'
Thus, only when the state proves too greedy in its taxing efforts or the affected reservation resource is sufficiently disconnected from the surrounding non-Indian economy
227 Id.
228 Id.

232

will the

at 899.

229 Id. at 900.
230 Id. at 903.
231 Id. at 898 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
140, 149 (1980)).
232 A unanimous Court emphasized the isolation of this reservation-based hunting
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state's capture of reservation-generated economic rents be disallowed. Despite these recent decisions, some legal commentators
insist that engagement by entrepreneurial tribes with the larger
American marketplace will prove the economic salvation of the
Indian peoples. They point to the gaming revenues generated by
American Indian casinos that now total over $8 billion annually
as the product of this successful engagement. 233 They further argue that these gaming tribes can arguably leverage an additional
$8 billion in indirect economic benefits to Indian Country by
preferentially contracting with and employing Indian contractors
and workers.23 4
But neither the gaming, nor the entrepreneurial tribe will
likely lead the way to the promised land of tribal economic selfdetermination. The 1988 enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) authorizes states to effectively dictate the
terms of gaming compacts to the affected tribes and to undermine the utility of gaming for tribal economic development.2 3 5
Some gaming tribes, it is true, have become fabulously
wealthy.2 36 But their critics contend that their success cannot be
realistically duplicated elsewhere in Indian Country. Relatively
few tribes enjoy those favorable locations near wealthy population centers that are key to the development of lucrative tribal
and fishing resource marketed to non-Indian customers as leaving no place for state
regulation:
The State has failed to "identify any regulatory function or service ... that
would justify" the assertion of concurrent regulatory authority. The hunting and fishing permitted by the Tribe occur entirely on the reservation.
The fish and wildlife resources are either native to the reservation or were
created by the joint efforts of the Tribe and the Federal Government. New
Mexico does not contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of
these resources, and can point to no other "governmental functions it provides" . . . in connection with hunting and fishing on the reservation by
non-members that would justify the assertion of its authority.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 341-42 (1983).
233 Kenneth E. Robbins, Casino Buying Power: Catalyst for Economic Development, 16 AM. INDIAN REP. 20 (2000).
234 Id.

235 Judge William C. Canby, joined by three other Ninth Circuit judges, dissented
from the circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc of the Rumsey decision. See Rumsey
Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997) ("But
under Rumsey . . . [t]he State thus has no incentive to negotiate, and there is no
system [due to the Seminole decision] to require negotiation. IGRA is rendered
toothless.").
236 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 739-54.
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casinos and bingo palaces. 237 Furthermore, Congress' enactment
of IGRA, as demonstrated by lower court interpretations of that
Act, has effectively nullified the tribes' hard-won legal triumph in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.238
Congress effectively extended state regulatory control over the
nature, scope and size of that most lucrative form of Indian gaming, now known as Class III gaming. Few states, in this brave
new world of cutthroat competition for the gaming dollar, are
likely to agree to large-scale, casino-style tribal gaming within
their borders unless the tribes are willing to share a substantial
portion of their gaming revenues with them. Furthermore, many
of the more conservative and traditional tribes likewise question
whether gaming is good for their own tribal members who may
gamble away their hard-earned money that they should use to
2 39
support their families.
But even deeper legal and ethical difficulties are presented by
the rise of the entrepreneurial tribe. First, such entrepreneurship
presupposes a tribal class who, functioning as tribal developers,
views their Indian peoples as "embodied" capital. Thus, the
"tragedy of development" plays out within Indian Country as tribal members are graded into hierarchical rankings that run
unidimensionally from the worst to best workers.2 4 ° Second, unless the entrepreneurial tribe convinces the federal court that its
revenues derive from its exploitation of a tribally-generated reservation value, the surrounding state may tax away much of the
economic rents derived from that economic activity.2 4 ' Third,
state sovereign immunity likely bars the entrepreneurial tribe
from suing the state for the redress of any injury from the state's
237

Id.

238 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
239 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 739-54.
240 Marshall Berman synthesizes Joseph Schumpeter's and Karl Marx's "creative
destruction" concept in describing the disruptive impact of economic development
on the social bonds and cultural ties of traditionally underdeveloped societies, such
as those of the Indian peoples. He quotes Marx as follows:
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy
is profaned, and men at last are forced to face . . . the real conditions of
their lives and their relations with their fellow men.
MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR

21 (1982).

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980).
241
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exercise of governmental power within Indian Country.2 4 2 These
factors combine to substantially limit the economic design within
which the entrepreneurial tribe can operate in service of tribal
self-determination.
G. Summary of Tribal Achievement via the Standard
Development Model
The sum total result of the Indian peoples' efforts to realize
self-determination via the standard development model of Indian
Country has been to fritter away their passions and energies in a
fruitless effort to escape their assigned tribal status. In bumping
up, again and again, against the brick ceiling of their legally-assigned status, the Indian peoples have demonstrated their tenacity and desire to survive. My suggestion in the next section is
that they turn their passions and energies to the very different
task of internally reconstructing the tribe to meet the real human
needs of their members.
II
TRIBES AS RICH NATIONS:

SKETCHING AN

ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF
TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION

A.

Why the Standard Model of Tribal Self-Determination Has
Failed Indian Country

Two rival interpretive processes must be reconciled if the Indian peoples are to realize meaningful tribal self-determination.
The first process constituted the "tribe" as the historical product
of non-Indian interaction with the indigenous people of North
America. The constructive processes of non-Indian historywar, disease, trade, treaties, common law, and European political
and socio-cultural theory-created the tribe as a means to serve
non-Indian ends. 24 3 The second process focuses on the ordinary
experiences of Indian people as the contemporary source for re242 The Supreme Court has held that a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity to
suit precludes tribes from suing the state. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775 (1991).
243 Professor Stephen Cornell argues that the "tribe" was created by those European and American negotiators "who searched for and often assumed comprehensive structures of authority or hierarchical political organization" among the Indian
people. CORNELL, supra note 3, at 78. Indeed, Cornell concludes that
"[c]omprehensive political organization at times was even made a prerequisite for
[federal] negotiations" with the Indian peoples. Id. at 79.
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constructing the tribe.24 4 The following discussion traces the failure of the former interpretive idea as a means for tribal selfdetermination; the latter interpretive idea is addressed in the
next section.
The first interpretive process hierarchically notched the tribe
into American law and governance as "domestic dependent nations. ' 24 5 It provided the structure for the channeling of American values into Indian Country.2 46 Its goal was to progressively
remake the Indian peoples in the American image. Its failure to
realize this goal by the 1880s counseled its abandonment in favor
of the Indian allotment policy. 247 Ironically, the "tribe" was revived in the 1930s by Indian Commissioner John Collier, and
later strengthened in the 1970s and 1980s by Presidents Nixon
and Reagan, as the express vehicle for indigenous self-determi244

Professor Cornell believes that there is evidence of the Indian peoples' self-

renewal:
The political resurgence of the last few decades has been a cultural resurgence as well. Tribal languages are being taught in some reservation
schools. Many young people are showing a new interest in their heritage.
Indian writers and painters have immersed themselves in the traditions of
their peoples, rearticulating them in new ways. The symbols of Indianness,
from bumper-sticker slogans to religious fetishes, are becoming more visible, not less. Much of this trend reflects an attempt by some individuals to
locate their own roots, to touch base with some identity more substantial
than the dominant culture seems able to provide, an attempt to put a
thicker flesh on the bones of their self-concept. The question is whether
this cultural resurgence will be realized in actual patterns of life and action
or will remain simply a veneer, an overlay on lives shaped to a large degree
by the non-Indian world, a collection of icons that symbolize an identity
and a past but organize little of contemporary life.
Id. at 212.
245 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
246 Cornell contends that the Europeans and Americans consciously sought to
transform the Indian peoples into tribes in order to "reproduce the processes of
interstate politics by which their own external relations were governed." CORNELL,
supra note 3, at 77.
247 Cornell describes this process of "de-tribalization" via the Indian allotment
legislation in these terms:
Allotment ... specified a new set of incorporative relationships .... Indians were able to retain significant control over land and related resources,
but only via allotment. [E]very Indian taking up allotment ... [became] a
citizen of the United States ... [and the] act envisioned both the individualization of tribal property and the dissolution of tribal polity. Indians were
to be incorporated as individuals into both the economic and political
structures of the larger society. It was the ultimate form of control: the end
of the tribe itself as a political and social entity.
Id. at 59.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 952 2000

Tribes as Rich Nations

nation. 248 Despite this organizational refashioning of the tribe, it
remains the means whereby American technology, financial interests, and commercial and social ideas are channeled into Indian Country.2 4 9
Why this tribal self-determination strategy has failed Indian
Country is evident from the practical counsel it offered to the
would-be self-determining tribe. In paraphrase it tells the tribe
that:
You must consciously remake yourself in a strategically
minded, adaptively useful and symbolically powerful way to
become successfully self-determining.2 5 0 Strategically, you
must identify and mobilize those resources on your reservation that can serve as tools for self-determination25 Adaptively, you must retool your inherited traditions and cultural
beliefs as means to successfully interact with the surrounding
non-Indian economies and governments. 252 Symbolically, you
must recast your government and legal institutions so as to
reasonably overlap with the American society's ruling notions
of due process and equal protection.25 3 In brief, you must be248 Indian Commissioner John Collier recognized in the 1930s, according to Professor Cornell, "the collapse of indigenous [Indian] political [institutions]." Id. at
95.
Collier's solution was to "insert individual Indians into the institutional structures
of the larger society, and those structures would be built into Indian communities
themselves." Id. at 94.
249 Collier's hope was that "[a]s Indian tribes voluntarily formed constitutional
governments, undertook the development of their own resources, and joined with
the federal government in the assault on poverty and ignorance, assimilation would
necessarily follow." Id. at 95.
250 Id.
251 Such counsel invites tribes to look beyond "relying exclusively on federal funding and gaming to build tribal coffers ...[and use] tax exempt bonds as a means of
ensuring their economic independence and tribal sovereignty." Melissa L.
Gedachian, Safeguarding Sovereignty with Tax Free Bonds, 13 INDIAN REP. 18
(1997). This article goes on to say that "experts agree that training tribal members
in finance is crucial for the future of tribal sovereignty." Id. at 20.
252 Dale Rood, a Turtle Clan representative to the Oneida Nation and part-time
special projects technician in the Nation's management information services department, aspires to use the Internet as a means of extending tribal sovereignty and
cultural renewal:
We're using the Internet to preserve our language and culture, but also to
enhance our lifestyle. We think it's important to maintain that website because we see it as an opportunity to tell our own story. Many times our
website is the first impression people will have of the Oneidas.
Marguerite D. Carroll, Indians on the Internet: Link to a Legacy, Path to the Future,
13 INDIAN REP. 12, 13 (1997).
253 The integration of tribes into American society has been ongoing since the
1930s and contemplates, according to Stephen Cornell, "the reproduction of dominant-group institutions and values-in particular, elected representative govern-

HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 953 2000

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79, 2000]

come non-Indian governments and societies if you are to realize self-determination.2 54
The only problem with this strategy is that it does not work!
The Eastern Cherokees, beginning after their early interaction
with American colonists, sought to follow this counsel by developing a written tribal alphabet, constitution, courts, schools, as
well as law and order codes, modeled on those extant in the surrounding American society. But their adaptive efforts did not
save them, or the other civilized eastern Indian tribes, from summary congressional removal in the 1830s west of the Mississippi
River.2 5 ' Likewise, the Suquamish Tribe's adoption in the 1970s
of a tribal criminal code guaranteeing fundamental due process
to all criminal defendants did not sustain its assertion of inherent
criminal jurisdiction over two, admittedly, very "bad" non-Indian
men on its reservation."6 It just did not matter, according to Justice Rehnquist's opinion, how successfully adapted the Suquamish people had become, the Indian tribe had, early on, been
divested by Marshall's Indian law opinions, of its inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. 7
Viewing the tribe as an adaptive unit has likewise failed as a
means of economic development within Indian Country. Frustrated by the lack of observable economic growth within Indian
Country, contemporary development experts have sought to
identify those "break-away" tribes who can serve as emulative
models for tribes who are arguably adrift in a sea of self-determination opportunities.25 8 Listless and becalmed tribes, too, can
hum with entrepreneurial energy if only they would governmentally, technologically and commercially restructure themselves so
as to take advantage of these opportunities.2 59
Indian law experts have also resorted to this first interpretive
process to diagnose and explain the root cause of the contemporary failure of tribal self-determination. The prescriptions they
offer as solutions focus on what the federal government should
ment, market-oriented economic organization, corporate business structureswithin Indian communities." CORNELL, supra note 3, at 152.
254
255
256
257
258

Id.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 11, at 93-128.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978).

Id.
Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country Today,

5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 5, 5-13 (1997).
259 Id.
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do to restore self-determining status to the tribe. First, the federal government should insulate the tribe from state intrusion
upon its essential governmental, economic and regulatory activities. 6° Second, the federal government should provide sufficient
economic infrastructure to the tribe so that it can pursue a reasonable economic and social recovery strategy.2 6 1 Third, the federal government should restore its historic tradition of bilateral
and transparent negotiation with the tribe as the basis for a new
government-to-government relationship.2 6 2 Fourth, the federal
government should embody in a new "sovereign trust duty"
those security guarantees that are essential to tribal self-determination. 263 Doubtless, the route to tribal self-determination would
be smoothed if these prescriptions were adopted by the federal
government. But, as both a practical and conceptual matter, federal acceptance of these prescriptions would amount to the overthrow of this governing interpretive process.
These advocates on behalf of the Indian peoples are undoubtedly sincere in their desire to address the many and real
problems that exist within today's Indian reservations. They
hope to better the Indian peoples' material conditions-upgrade
their health status, increase their per capita income, increase
their children's educational attainment levels, and generate more
reservation-based employment opportunities. But the Indian
peoples are aware, as are many non-Indian peoples, that it is not
the deprivation of material options that has produced today's
dispirited generation of children, both on-reservation and off-reservation. Lost Indian children, like some non-Indian children,
seek their identity through peer-governed rituals of gang membership, Indian-on-Indian violence, substance abuse, flirtations
with suicide, and other forms of antisocial behavior. These phenomena evidence a deeper crisis within contemporary Indian societies than cannot be encompassed within a handbook on tribal
260 Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest
Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281 (1995).
261 Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of
Indian Country in the Twenty-first Century, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 425 (1998) [hereinafter
Cross, Sovereign Bargains].
262 Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 WASH. L.
REV. 1063, 1065 (1997).
263 Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources. 1995
UTAH L. REV. 109.
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economic development.2 64
Socio-biologists tell us that the creation of such "wolf-children" within Indian Country is the expected product of systemically ill communities-communities unable to come to grips with
the pathologies such as fetal alcohol syndrome, child abuse, alcoholism, chronic unemployment and domestic violence. 265 Authentic tribal self-determination will require the Indian peoples
to acknowledge and directly confront this painful reality. Current federal Indian policy exteriorizes responsibility for "doing
something" about this reality to the BIA or IHS, as well as other
federal agencies. So far, none of the federally-sponsored programs or grants have done much to address the underlying generative processes that produce these societal pathologies within
Indian Country.26n Only by reinternalizing these problems
within the Indian communities themselves will lasting and sus264 The success of Indian gaming enterprises on some reservations has brought
new addictions and new dangers to the Indian communities. It is not "uncommon at
many gaming facilities to see children roaming the halls, playing video games or
swimming at the pool-often unsupervised-while their parents are gambling." See
Marguerite D. Carroll, Who's Minding the Kids?, 14 INDIAN REP. 18 (1998). The
most obvious community costs involve Indian "families going there anyway and casinos are forced to deal with things like children being left in cars for hours." Id. at
19.
265 Sociologist James L. Coleman explains such systemically ill communities as
ones where "the social system comes to consist of individualistic solutions to individual problems; with all suffering at the hands of each as each carries out his acts
unconstrained by their consequences for others." James S. Coleman, Norms as Social Capital,in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: ECONOMICS APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD

OF ECONOMICS 153 (Gerard Radnitsky & Peter Bernholz eds., 1987).
1997 BIA statistics estimate that 375 gangs with about 4,650 members operate in
or near Indian Country. Tribes such as the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota are only now trying to get a handle on this issue.
The principal of New Town High School, Spencer Wilkinson, says that "[w]e have a
lot of these problems-drug abuse, alcohol abuse-that big cities have, but we're
out here in the boondocks." See Melissa Goldblatt, Getting A Grip On Gangs, 14
INDIAN REP. 26 (1998).

This tribe has taken the first step among tribes to seek to coordinate their ordinances with those of the BIA, city and county authorities in an effort to address
gang-related violence. Id.
266 The Justice Department's recent study regarding violent crime among
America's different races confirms this difficult reality. While violent crime rates
have dropped significantly among other racial groups, the incidence of violent crime
among American Indians remains disturbingly high. Indians are twice as likely to be
victims of violent crimes than blacks, whites or Asians. Indian women were victimized by their partners twice as often as black women. The study by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics looked at statistics for rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggrevated assault, and simple assault for the period 1993 through 1998. See MISSOULIAN NEWSPAPER, Mar. 19, 2001, at A5.
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tainable solutions to these difficulties be crafted and successfully
implemented.2 67
B.

Structuring the Transcendent Model of
Tribal Self-Determination

Folding the tribe into non-Indian history has locked the Indian
peoples into an unyielding interpretive process that, as told by
my four-year-old daughter's pre-school song, is "too deep to go
under it, too wide to go around it, too high to go over it, so I
guess we will have to go through it."'26 8 That is exactly what the
Indian peoples will have to do. But "going through" this veil of
non-Indian history will require the Indian peoples to expend
much social and emotional energy. By interpolating the tribe
into non-Indian history, federal policy makers sought to co-opt
the Indian peoples' underlying cultures and traditions into
America's melting pot. Only by creating disjunctures between
this interpolated history through tactics of cultural and social resistance have the Indian peoples survived. 26 9 This strategy is illustrated by the young Black Elk's vision:
And as I looked and wept, I saw that there stood on the north
side of the Starving camp a Sacred man who was painted red

all over his body, and he held a spear as he walked into the
center of his people, and there he laid down and rolled. And
267 Id.

268 Lyrics available upon request.
269 The Indian people became "props" setting the stage for the American epic
about the conquest of the West. Professor Nathan Glazer argues the Winning of the
West, written on an epic scale by Teddy Roosevelt, created the national text of "unabashed nationalism" for the displacement and dispossession of the Indian people.
The Indians in Roosevelt's text are unredeemably cruel and treacherous. He characterizes the Indians thus:
Not only were they very terrible in battle, but they were cruel beyond all
belief in victory .... The hideous, unnameable, unthinkable tortures [practiced] by the red men on their captured [foes'] tender women and helpless
children, were such as we read of in no other struggle, hardly even the
revolting pages that tell the deeds of the Holy Inquisition.
Glazer, supra note 43. at 12.
Given the unredeemable Indian character, Roosevelt feels no need for a retrospective national apology for their destruction by federal military forces:
Looking back, it is easy to say that much of the wrong-doing could have
been prevented; but if we examine the facts to find out the truth, not to
establish a theory, we are bound to admit that the struggle could not possibly have been avoided. .... Unless we were willing that the whole continent
west of the Alleghenies should remain as unpeopled waste, the hunting
ground of savages, war was inevitable."
Id. at 12-13.
HeinOnline -- 79 Or. L. Rev. 957 2000

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79, 20001

when he got up it was a fat bison standing there, and where
the bison stood a Sacred herb sprang up right where the tree
had been in the center of the nation's hoop. The herb grew
and bore four blossoms on a single stem while I was lookinga blue, a white, a scarlet and 2a7yellow-and the bright rays of
these flashed to the heavens. 0
Cultural survival requires much psychic and social energy and
has not been accomplished without significant damage to the Indian peoples. Psychologists have diagnosed a syndrome they
have named "inter-generational post-traumatic stress disorder"
to describe the long term effect of two hundred years of federal
policy on the Indian peoples.2 71 Some have characterized it as a
"spiritual injury" in these terms:
It is apparent that the psyche of the community recognized the
wounding of the community, and that this awareness in turn
was perceived as a wounding of the psyche. Harmony had become discord and the community's unconscious perception
was that the world was unfriendly and hostile. The problems
that were manifested and verbalized were merely symptoms of
a deeper wound-the soul wound.272
Just as new therapeutic approaches have been developed that
address the inter-generational transmission of Indian parental
traumatic experiences and responses to their children, so too
must a new theory of the tribe seek to support the Indian peoples' growing societal and cultural revitalization efforts.27 3 Only
by reconnecting the revitalizing sphere of Indian socio-cultural
life to the tribal governmental sphere of legitimate authority will
tribal life-worlds be restored.
Linking Tribal Self-Determination to the Restoration of
Tribal Life-Worlds

C.

Behind the positivistic legal formulation of the tribe-defined
by federal Indian common law, treaties and statutes-exists the
real world of the Indian peoples' experiences. This world has
rarely interested those federal policy makers who fashioned decisional rules for resolving practical conflicts between Indians and
non-Indians over land, trade, water, economic activities, natural
270 BONNIE DURAN ET AL., NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY

70 (Russell Thompson ed., 1998).
271
272
273

Id.
Id.
Id.
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resources, and crime. 74 Indeed, it was their studied lack of interest in the almost overwhelming diversity of Indian life-worlds
that enabled the cultural survival of the contemporary Indian
peoples. Restoring tribal life-worlds requires a new tribe, one
that reconnects the Indian peoples with a newly-legitimized tribal
sphere of governance. As A. K. Sen persuasively argues in his
new book, Development As Freedom, only by relinking democratic governance to a society's defining value orientations will
the derived and surface political expressions legitimate governmental action.2 7 5 Only by re-embedding the tribe, long detached
from the underlying tribal society by the IRA and similar positivistic legal initiatives, will tribal governmental action accord with
the real interest of the Indian peoples.2 76
Sen structures societal governance as the primary means of realizing human freedom. He offers three principles for the development of this type of democratic governance. First, full
development of human capabilities demands that any society accord to all its members the opportunity for meaningful social and
political participation.2 7 7 Second, individuals and groups within
that society must be encouraged to conceptualize their needs and
demands in a socially comprehensible manner that can be politically expressed through their governing institutions. 7 8 Third, the
governing institutions must demonstrate that they "hear" these
demands and respond to these needs through governmental ac274 This lack of interest in the contemporary Indian world is quite understandable
from the non-Indian standpoint. Teddy Roosevelt in his multi-volume epic, Winning
the West, viewed the Indian world as "finished" and sought to give "moral closure"
to that outcome. The Indian world had ended and the white world was beginning in
America according to Roosevelt's historical narrative of the West. Thus,
Roosevelt's lack of interest in the Indian peoples is part of a larger fashioning of a
new American narrative described by Professor White:
The historical narrative . . . reveals to us a world that is putatively "finished," done with .... Insofar, as historical stories can be completed, can
be given narrative closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they
give to reality the odor of the ideal . . . . The demand for closure in the
historical story is a demand, I suggest, for moral meaning, a demand that
sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a
moral drama.
DENNIS

K.

IDEOLOGY

MUMBY, COMMUNICATION AND POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS: DISCOURSE,
AND DOMINATION

110 (1988)

(quoting H.

WHITE,

COURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 24 (1980)).
275 AMARTYA KOMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM

277

Id.
Id.

278

Id.

276
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tion that demonstrates societal accountability.2 7 9
By giving both a "thin" and "thick" account of how the application of Sen's model may contribute to the restoration of tribal
life-worlds, I hope to reconcile these two rival processes. At the
thin level, I propose several background principles that are necessary, but not sufficient, for reconnecting the new tribe and the
underlying tribal societies. At the thick level, I tell a story about
how real tribal people-the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples of the Fort Berthold Reservation-may apply these principles to recover, socially and economically, from the devastating
effects of the 1949 federal taking that virtually destroyed their
reservation. My goal in telling this story is to reweave orienting
tribal beliefs and values of these Indian peoples into a coherent
pattern of socially comprehensible governmental action. By
combining these thin and thick accounts of tribal restoration, I
hope to reconcile these two rival interpretive views within the
body of a new, unifying entity-the "new tribe."
D.

Taking the First Steps Toward the New Tribe

Only the "new tribe" can restore the communicative power of
the Indian peoples and thereby give content to the now empty
concept of tribal self-determination. The Supreme Court in its
1978 decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez280 recognized
that only the Indian peoples can speak to those basic constitutional issues, such as the eligibility criteria for tribal membership,
that define a distinct peoples. The Court's refusal to hear a female tribal member's challenge to the Pueblo's ordinance that
denied tribal membership to the children of those tribal women
who choose to marry outside of the tribe accorded "proper respect for tribal sovereignty" according to the majority. 8
The Martinez decision permits the fundamental reworking of a
tribe's relationship to its constituent societal elements, whether
traditional or modern, without undue interference from the federal government. That decision wisely leaves it up to the respective Indian peoples to determine when, if ever, they will fully
adapt their institutions to accord with prevailing non-Indian notions of wise societal governance. The contemporary Indian peo279 Id.
280 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
281 ld. at

60.
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pies are left to take the next step on their own to realize the
restoration of tribal life-worlds.
1.

The "Thin" Theory of the New Tribe

For those Indian peoples who choose to take the next step, I
offer the following "thin" and "thick" observations to guide them
in this endeavor. At the thin level, I offer two background principles that are necessary for creating the new tribe. First, these
Indian peoples must be reasonably immune to what Professor
Mary Midgley calls the "menace of fatalism." Many non-Indian
people, as well as some Indian people, are deeply skeptical of the
ability of today's Indian peoples to realize tribal self-determination. That skepticism is sometimes expressed in terms of the Indian peoples' innate genetic, biological or cultural characteristics
that will doom any real chance for tribal self-determination.2 8 2
While the Indian peoples must realistically assess those dangers
and risks that hedge their opportunities for self-determination,
they must not allow such fears to paralyze tribal action by giving
undue weight to a non-Indian view of history that has long since
written the Indian peoples' epitaph.2 83
Second, the Indian peoples must adopt the principle of
"enoughness" as expressing their confidence that they can use
their existing material and social resources effectively to re-define and meet their pressing human development needs. This is a
realistic presumption given that most Indian peoples have the
available resources to meet the material subsistence needs of
their members. Such a base is the reasonable starting point for
282 Teddy Roosevelt saw the demise of the Indian peoples as inevitable given that
"[d]uring the past three centuries, the spread of the English-speaking peoples across
the world's waste spaces has been not only the most striking feature in the world's
history, but also the event of all others most far-reaching in its effects and importance." Glazer, supra note 43, at 12.
283 Professor Clark Wissler asks "Did the Indians Live in Vain?":
When we look back over the spectacle of Indian annihilation, the ruthless
advance of the frontier crushing out the lives of Indians on every hand,
though sacrificing a lot of white blood to achieve this end, we moved to
ask: Did the Indian live in vain? Was all that he did, struggled for, fought
for ten thousand years to be obliterated in three centuries? Was it misplaced charity on the part of the victors to put their helpless victims on
reservations, to be wasted by disease, hunger and poverty, and later do
everything possible to keep them alive merely to live as minorities? . . .

There are no satisfactory answers.
CLARK WISSLER, INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES

326 (1940).
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the Indian peoples to begin the creation of the new tribe.2 84
2.

The "Thick" Theory of the New Tribe: A Case Study of the
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples' Struggle for
Social and Economic Recovery from the
1949 Garrison Taking

The removal of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples in
1953 from the Fort Berthold Reservation to make way for the
Garrison Dam was perhaps the most traumatic event they faced
since the 1837 smallpox epidemic devastated their population,
virtually wiping out the Mandan people. Although the trauma
imposed on these peoples played its way out in many destructive
private and public displays-such as greatly increased welfare
dependency, domestic violence and alcoholism-I focus on its
catalytic effect in spurring subsequent tribal action directed to
social and economic recovery of these Indian peoples from the
debilitating effects of the Garrison taking.28 5
Historian Roy W. Meyer correctly assigns the bulk of the
blame for the Garrison Dam to "Congress and . .. those segments of the public who brought pressure on their elected representatives to have it built. '2 8 6 But it is the tribal people and their
leaders who ultimately bear the responsibility to frame an adequate response so as to ensure their eventual recovery from this
man-made disaster. I evaluate two distinct tribal responses to
this disaster and evaluate their potential for facilitating tribal col284 The starting point for authentic self-determination may well be the Indian peoples' recognition of this principle:
The shift to postmaterialist values calls into question the distribution of
power: deep shifts in existing structures are needed to make and execute
the kind of choices that will lead to sustainability. Therefore sustainability
is inseparable from personal and collective empowerment.

A revitalized

democratic spirit, expressed in a myriad of forms, indicates the viability of
a participatory political culture ....Individuals in an expansive democratic

system do not so much discover the common good as create it, by interacting with each other and constructing share purposes ... self-governance in
the public sphere helps transform conflicting interests into common ones
while at the same time promoting individual autonomy and freedom. Personal transformation and social transformation are thus reciprocally
related.
STEPHEN WOOLPERT, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITIcs: AN OVERVIEW 172-73 (Stephen Woolpert et al. eds., 1998).

285 See Cross, Sovereign Bargains, supra note 261, at 477-509.
286 Roy W. MEYER, THE VILLAGE INDIANS OF THE UPPER MISSOURI: THE MANDAN, HIDATSA AND ARIKARA 233 (1977).
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lective action directed to the social and economic recovery of
these peoples from the 1949 Garrison taking.
a.

Response 1: The Tribal Decision to Spend the Entire
$7.5 Million in Compensationfor the 1949 Garrison
Taking as Per Capita Payments to Individual
Tribal Members

Political in-fighting between two powerful tribal leaders-Martin Cross and Carl Whitman, Jr.-focused on how to spend the
$7.5 million payable to the tribal peoples as just compensation
for their economic losses stemming from the Garrison taking.
Cross favored the per capita distribution of virtually all of the
monies to individual tribal members, while Whitman favored the
retention of most of these monies in tribal programs to address
the long-term recovery needs of the people.2 87
This issue dominated tribal politics from the 1950 tribal council
election until 1957 when the final distribution plan for these
monies was approved by Congress. Cross used his pro per capita
platform in the 1950 election to defeat Whitman. The BIA, in
the throes of the termination era, sought to exploit this issue as
grounds for proposing the termination of the tribe. Indian Commissioner Myer concluded that if the tribal government was competent to spend millions of dollars, then it no longer needed the
supervision of the BIA.28 8 Cross and the tribal council responded to Myer's proposed termination of their tribe in an artful manner: "[W]e are not opposed to the withdrawal by the
government of any help that they give us .... We only oppose
their interference with our management of our own property and
money."'28 9 This artful dodge by the tribal council worked to prevent the BIA's proposed termination of the Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara peoples.
While Cross and Whitman battled over money and tribal
power, the coming reality of the destruction of the Fort Berthold
Reservation was graphically depicted on the cover of the Fort
Berthold Agency News Bulletin. Lake Sakakawea, the reservoir
to be created by the Garrison Dam, was portrayed as a sea
serpent spreading its tentacles over a radically segmented and di287
288
289

Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
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vided Fort Berthold Reservation.2 9 °
The BIA-given the traumatized daze of the tribal peoplestruggled to formulate governmental, economic and social responses to this new reality. One BIA inspired remedy-relocation-would move young Indian men and women from the
reservation to urban areas such as Denver, Oakland and Chicago. The hope was that their chances for employment, after the
completion of a trade or craft apprenticeship, would materially
improve their life chances. Many young people from Fort Berthold went through the "relocation" process in the 1950s and
1960s, but few, if any, experienced any permanent improvement
in their material circumstances. 29 '
The new agency superintendent, Ben Reifel, strongly supported the relocation program stating that "[a] reservation is fast
becoming just a place where some Indians were born. The
United States is the Indian citizen's 'reservation' today."2 9' 2 A
later superintendent, Ralph Shane, similarly asserted that the Indians would one day thank the United States because their removal is "by no means the end of the trail for any people, any
culture, any way of life, nor an ascending economy."'2 93 He believed that the Indians' removal, just like their evacuation from
Like-A-Fishhook Village in the 1880s would lead to their ultimate renewal if they could rise to meet the challenge.2 94
The BIA's vision was to recreate Fort Berthold as new, dispersed tribal communities on the residual high-plains of the reservation. These new communities-Mandaree, Twin Buttes and
New Town-sought to fuse the three tribal groups into one new
tribal identity. Indeed, the name "Mandaree" is a composite of
the syllables Mandans, Hidatsa and Arikaree.295 But the reality
of physical separation on the desolate high plains imposed severe
limits on the governmental and economic re-integration of the
Fort Berthold Reservation. The deteriorating social welfare status of the Indians is reflected in the substantial decline of their
income from farming and grazing leases. While 39% of their income came from that source in the pre-dam era, only 10% of
their income derived from that source after the Garrison Dam.
290 Id. at 233.
291 Id. at 226.
292 Meyer, supra note 286, at 226.
293 Id. at 228.
294

Id.

295 Id.
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Welfare, which had been a negligible source of income for the
Indians prior to the dam, increased nine-fold after the Garrison
2 96

Dam.

The most telling effect of the Garrison Dam has been the absorption of the Indian peoples into the surrounding non-Indian
institutions and economy. Their distinctive Indian schools disappeared and most Indian children either attended public school or
made the long trek off-reservation to the BIA boarding
schools.2 9 7 Young Indian men and women began to see themselves as primarily wage-laborers, hiring out as help on non-Indian run ranches and farms or relocating off-reservation. This
fact is reflected in the increase in reservation wage income from
14% in the pre-dam era to 43% in the post-dam era.298 While
the scope of psychological damage cannot be fully summarized in
statistics, the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples clearly had
to face substantial adjustment challenges in adapting to their new
reservation setting.2 9 9
Response 2: The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples'
Long Struggle to Recover Just Compensation for the
1949 Garrison Taking

b.

In 1984 the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples had the opportunity to renew their claim for just compensation for the 1949
Garrison taking. The Garrison Diversion Unit Commission
(GDUC), an eleven-member congressionally appointed body,
concluded that these Indians had borne a disproportionate share
of the economic burden in having the Garrison Dam and reservoir located on their tribal homelands. 0 0 It based this finding on
its review of the legislative record of the 1949 Takings Act. The
GDUC was convinced by this review that the Indians had suffered devastating economic, cultural and social losses due to the
federal government's taking of their most productive agricultural
lands. It also found that Congress may have failed to make the
Id.
Meyer, supra note 286, at 228.
Id.
Id.
300 This was the finding of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission (GDUC), an
eleven-member congressional commission that was created in 1984 to assess the impacts of the Garrison Project on the peoples of North Dakota. See Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission on H.R. 1116, A Bill to Implement
Certain Recommendations Made Pursuant to Pub. L. 98-360: Hearings on H.R. 1116
Before the Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, 99th Cong. 114 (1985).
296
297
298
299
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Indian peoples whole for their economic losses arising from the
1949 taking.3" 1 It therefore directed the Indians' trustee-the Interior Secretary-to hold administrative hearings on the Indians'
30 2
just compensation and related claims.
Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel was directed by the
GDUC to establish a secretarial commission that would examine
the Indians' just compensation and related claims. He was also
directed to recommend appropriate implementing legislation if
his commission concluded that the federal government had failed
to justly compensate these Indians for their losses arising from
the taking. Secretary Hodel established the Joint Tribal Advisory
Committee (JTAC) by secretarial charter in 1985 to hear and
evaluate the Indians' claims arising from the 1985 taking of their
reservation.3 °3
c.

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Indians Just
Compensation Case Before the Joint Tribal Advisory
Commission (JTAC)

The hearings before the JTAC provided the organizational catalyst for these tribal peoples to join together and present personal testimony and other evidence regarding the devastating
effects of the 1949 taking on their culture and economy. The
JTAC construed its charter so as to allow the Indian people to
Id. at 114.
It recommended that the Interior Secretary establish a five-member commission to assess and report on the steps necessary to "complete the indemnification of
the Indian communities of North Dakota that were disrupted by construction of
Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program dams and reservoirs." Id. at 74.
The GDUC recommended that the Interior Secretary appoint the commission no
later than January 31, 1984, to address the following issues on the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation:
a. Full potential for irrigation.
b. Financial assistance for on-farm development costs.
c. Replacement of infrastructure lost by the creation of the Garrison
Dam.
d. Preferential rights to Pick-Sloan Missouri River Basin power.
e. Development of shoreline recreational potential.
f. Return of excess lands.
g. Additional financial compensation.
h. Protection of reserved water rights.
i. Other items the five-member commission may deem appropriate.
j. Funding of all items from Garrison Diversion Unit funds, if authorized.
Id. at 187.
303 Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel created the JTAC on May 10, 1985, and
the committee submitted its final report to him on May 23, 1986. See S. REP. No.
102-250 (1992).
301
302
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present relevant expert and lay testimony regarding their just
compensation claim against the United States. 30 4 They urged the
JTAC to review all the circumstances surrounding this federal
taking. Such a comprehensive review was essential for the com-

mission's reliable inquiry into the fairness of the taking of the
Fort Berthold Reservation.
Whether the federal government had made a good faith effort
to justly compensate the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples
was the most significant issue confronted by the JTAC. That issue focused the JTAC's attention on the administrative and legislative record that ostensibly justified the 1949 Garrison taking.30 5
Testimony by natural resource economists and related experts
aided the JTAC in its examination of the Indians' claims.30 6 They
provided the JTAC with a valuation theory of Indian lands that
fulfilled the "make whole" command of the Just Compensation
Clause.30 7 Other expert testimony provided the JTAC with historical and sociological evidence of the taking's devastating effects on the social and cultural life of these Indian people.30 8
But the Indians' claim for just compensation was strenuously
opposed by the BIA.3 ° 9 Indeed, Secretary Hodel eliminated the
304 The GDUC's finding that the "tribes of the... Fort Berthold Indian Reserva-

tion bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing Pick-Sloan Missouri River
Basin Program mainstem reservoirs," and its direction to the Secretary that he "find
ways to resolve inequities borne by the tribes" were interpreted by the JTAC as a
warrant for hearing the Indians' just compensation claims. See S. REP. No. 102-250,
at 3 (1991).
305 Id.

306 Dr. Cummings valued tribal lands that were taken by estimating the "flow of
the land base earnings or income that was attributable to that resource." He then
"capitalized [the expected income flows] at 3.5% which was then the Congressionally-mandated rate in 1950, and then he raised that [amount] to 1986 dollars. At
the time of the filing of the JTAC report, this totaled $178.4 million for the Fort
Berthold Reservation." See Ronald G. Cummings, Valuing the Resource Base Lost
by the Three Affiliated Tribes as Result of Lands Taken from Them for the Garrison
Project 47 (Feb. 13, 1986) (unpublished report prepared for the JTAC, on file with
the author).
307 The JTAC chairman, General Murry, testified at the hearings on S. 168, the
Equitable Compensation Act for the Three Affiliated Tribes, that the enactment of
just compensation legislation on behalf of these tribes would serve as a means for
helping the tribes re-establish a viable economic base "that was destroyed by the
construction of the [Garrison Dam and Reservoir]." Id. at 2.
308 Id.
309 The Senate report accompanying S. 168 recounts that the BIA's testimony was
"strongly opposed to S. 168 [because] the United States is under no continuing legal
liability to provide any additional compensation to [the tribes]." S. Rep. No. 102250, at 3 (1985).
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just compensation issue from the JTAC's charter despite the
GDUC's explicit directive to the contrary.3 1 0 However, the
JTAC construed the "other issues" portion of its charter so as to
allow it to hear the Indians' just compensation claim. The BIA
argued that the Takings Act barred this claim. But the GDUC's
express direction and its own secretarial charter persuaded the
commission that it could examine the equity of the Indians' just
compensation claim.3 1 1
d.

The Resolution of the Indians' Just Compensation Claim by
the JTAC

The Indians argued before the JTAC that Senator Arthur V.
Watkins' Senate Indian Affairs Committee had demonstrably
failed to justly compensate them for their taken lands. They argued that their lands should have been valued on the same basis
as non-Indian lands that served comparable government and
public welfare functions.3 12 They contended that this valuation
standard would fulfill two important underlying goals of the Just
Compensation Clause. First, such a valuation standard would ensure the continuing viability of the affected Indian peoples as a
recognized government consistent with the purpose of their 1886
agreement with the federal government.3 13 Second, such a valuation standard would discourage future "rent seeking" initiatives
by Indian congressional committees that sought to exploit their
plenary power over Indian lands for their non-Indian constituents' benefits. 4
The Indians' treaty-reserved lands formed the essential trust
res that supported their governmental and economic infrastructure. As land, it was comprised of the 156,035 acres of easily
irrigable bottom lands that were taken by the federal government. Destruction of those lands imposed uncompensated eco310 Id.

311 See Hearings on S. 168, at 30-1 (1985).
312 Cummings concluded the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation represented a
dedicated public entity whose land possessed a value to the tribal community that
far transcended its fair market value. Cummings, supra note 306, at 14-15.
313 Cummings points to the Indian congressional committees' keen awareness, in
light of the MRBI reports, that the Fort Berthold Indians would lose the vast majority of their arable and irrigable land base essential for carrying out the purpose of
the 1886 agreement. Id. at 23-24.
314 The Supreme Court enunciated the equivalent value or standard for just compensation in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 341
(1893).
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nomic losses on those Indians that could be measured only by the
capitalized values of the expected future incomes that would
have been generated by those lands.3 15
The JTAC recognized that the federal government had a legal
duty to make the Indians whole for their economic losses. Therefore the JTAC directed Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a leading natural resource economist, to do an assessment of the Indians'
economic losses imposed by the 1949 taking.31 6 He was directed
to use known and accepted 1949 valuation standards as the
means to capitalize the stream of income the Indians would have
received from those lands. Such a valuation approach replicated
Congress' 1946 valuation standard that required the War Department to provide the Indians with the "in-kind" replacement
value of their taken lands. The War Secretary had been directed
to provide the Indians with land comparable in quality and sufficient in area to compensate the tribes for the land on the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation inundated by the construction of
the Garrison Dam.3 17 The JTAC interpreted this congressional
standard as holding that only 'in-kind' or substitute compensation would fairly compensate these Indian peoples for the loss of
their lands."3'18
The JTAC's next task was to determine what amount of replacement or substitute value would adequately compensate the
Indians for the taking of their lands. Such an alternate valuation
standard had been endorsed by the Supreme Court in the taking
of lands that served essential governmental or public welfare
functions. That the Indians' taken lands provided the social welfare and governmental benefits described by the Court was evidenced by their use of those lands for tribal farming and ranching
activities as contemplated by the 1886 agreement. Only the continued existence of these lands, or the just compensation
equivalent, would enable the affected Indians to fulfill those
treaty-defined goals.
The JTAC issued its final report in 1986 and recommended
that the Secretary of Interior propose federal legislation on beId.
Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Equitable Compensation Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 168 Before the Select Comm. on Ind. Affairs, 102d
Cong. 16-19 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 168] (statement of Kent Conrad,
U.S. Senator).
317 NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY 251-52 (Ray H. Mattison ed., 1968).
318 S. REP. No. 102-250, at 3 (1992).
315
316
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half of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples that would
award them just compensation for the 1949 taking of the Fort
Berthold Reservation.3 19 The JTAC recommended that the just
compensation amount should range between $178.4 million and
$411.8 million. In calculating compensation, the JTAC had directed Dr. Cummings to use two alternative formulas. The
JTAC's award range reflects the application of the alternative
valuation formulas.3 2 °
e.

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples Confront the
Challenge of Social and Economic Recovery on the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation

Interior Secretary Hodel declined to accept the JTAC report
or implement any of the commission's recommendations. Instead, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and the
House Interior Subcommittee on Water and Power initiated joint
oversight hearings on the JTAC's final report in 1986.321 The
JTAC's just compensation recommendation was referred by the
Select Committee to the General Accounting Office (GAO) for
its analysis and response. The GAO report, issued in 1990, concluded that, although it somewhat disagreed with the economic
methodology used by the JTAC, the JTAC's findings provided a
substantial basis for Congress to consider an equitable award of
just compensation to the Indians in the amount of $149.5 million.322 Legislation to implement the JTAC's just compensation
recommendation was introduced by Senator Kent Conrad from
3 19

Id.

320 Id.
321 The Senate report accompanying S. 168 notes that the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs held three oversight hearings on the JTAC recommendations
beginning on March 31, 1987, with a joint oversight hearing with the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee and the Water and Power Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. This hearing examined the need
for legislation to implement the recommendations of the JTAC report. The second
hearing was held on November 19, 1987, wherein the committees "urged" the Tribes
to provide "further justification for the level of additional financial compensation to
which they felt they were entitled" and "explore a budget neutral means to finance
the compensation needed to carry out the recommendations." The third hearing
was held regarding S. 168 wherein the tribes "expressed their overall support for the
bill" and the GAO "expressed its approval of the compensation figures set forth in

[S. 168]." Id.
322 See Government Accounting Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Select
Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate Indian Issues: Compensation Claims Analysis Overstates Economic Losses (1991).
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North Dakota.3 23 It provided $149.5 million in just compensation
to the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples for the 1949 Fort
Berthold taking. The BIA testified that it had no opposition to
this legislation as long as it otherwise met the "pay-as-you-go"
constraints of the controlling budget resolution.32 4
The Indians, after lengthy discussion with various interested
groups, including the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, were able to craft an agreement that would authorize the
deposit of a specified amount of Pick-Sloan hydropower receipts
into a Treasury account on behalf of the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara peoples.32 5 The Indians were required to submit an economic and social recovery plan to the Interior Secretary that
would govern the future expenditure of the just compensation
monies. The Indians would have access to the accumulated interest on that account once it reached the amount of $149.5 million.
President Bush threatened to veto the legislation but, nonetheless, signed the Act into law in November 1992 as part of a larger
water resources development bill.3 26
E.

The "Disjunctive" Moment: How the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara Peoples May Achieve Social and Economic
Recovery on the Fort Berthold Reservation

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples have survived
much over the past two hundred years since their first encounter
with American power in the late fall of 1804 during their tribal
council meetings with the leaders of the American Corps of Discovery, Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. They
now confront a new "disjunctive" moment in their collective life
as an Indian people. Can they effectively use the $149.5 million
in just compensation to reverse history and recover socially and
economically as a distinct people? Unlike the "one-shot" tribal
decision to "per-cap" the entire $7.5 million in compensation in
the 1957 tribal referendum, the "pay-out" structure of the governing statute and the congressional constraints on the use of the
323 See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 316, at 13-15.

324 The BIA representative testified that if the "Budget Enforcement Act provisions can be complied with ... the administration would look at that and give consideration to the additional compensation." Id. at 32 (statement of Patrick A.
Hayes, Bureau of Indian Affairs representative).
325 Id.
326 Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, 106 Stat. 4600.
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$149.5 million precludes any such self-interested solution to this
disjunctive moment. Like it or not, the governing statute distributes only the accrued interest from this trust fund on an annualized basis to the tribal people. They will therefore be forced
again and again to collectively re-decide the best use of that distributed interest income for their economic and social recovery
as a tribal people.3 27
As "repeat players," the various tribal constituencies, who
favor competing social and economic recovery projects, will be
forced to build tribal coalitions and alliances so as to convince
the Interior Secretary that a majority of the Indian people support their particular approach to social and economic recovery
on the Fort Berthold Reservation. There is some evidence that
such a process is already underway among the Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara peoples. Between 1992 and 1999, the accrued annual interest on this fund of $149.5 million accumulated $33 million. The pending secretarial distribution of this large sum of
money has prompted much heated discussion among various tribal constituencies as to the appropriate use of this money for social and economic recovery purposes.32 8
The current tribal business council has proposed a plan for investing $30 million of the money in a tribal endowment fund that
would be managed by a private investment firm. It promises that
this investment will earn an expected annual interest rate of 10%
compared to the 6.5% annual rate of interest that they would
earn if they are administered by the Office of Trust Funds Management (OTFM). Under the tribal council's plan, about 50% of
the annual income would be made available for tribal programs
consistent with its proposed social and economic recovery
329
plan.
327 Section 3504(a)(4) of the Act provides that "[s]uch interest shall be available
[to the Three Affiliated Tribes] ... for use for educational, social welfare, economic
development, and other programs, subject to the approval of the Secretary." Section 3506 provides that "[n]o part of any moneys in any fund, under this title shall be
distributed to any member of the Three Affiliated Tribes ... on a per capita basis."
328 An opinion letter by Mr. Jerry Nagel, a tribal member and vice-chairman of
the Fort Berthold Land Owners Association, challenged the proposed tribal investment plan. His letter states that "the council wants a dowery for themselves not an
endowment for [the tribal members]." He continues, saying that the proposed tribal
referendum on this plan presents the tribal members with an option to "vote to get
25% of nothing or 50% of nothing and the council gets 100% to spend at will." (on
file with author).
329 Id.
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But the proposed plan also authorizes the tribal business council to invade the fund's corpus and use up to 25% of its principal
as security for any borrowing authorized by the tribal council.
This provision has been greeted with skepticism by many tribal
members. They question whether stepping away from federal
trust management of this major tribal resource is a good idea.
Some fear that this is a "power-grab" by a potentially corrupt
tribal council that would misuse these tribal funds for personal
benefit. Other tribal members fear that approval of such a plan
would motivate individuals to "get on the council" so that they
can invade proposed endowment funds for their own pet
projects.33 °
This internal tribal controversy over the use of this $33 million,
far from dismaying anyone, should evidence the catalytic moment wherein the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples strive to
reclaim responsibility for their economic and social futures. It is
a daunting task, but only these Indian peoples can successfully
re-internalize those values, needs and circumstances that brought
them together originally as the Three Affiliated Tribes. Indeed,
this $149.5 million may serve as the crude surrogate for those
values as these Indian peoples seek to reconstitute their society
so as to accomplish social and economic recovery. 331 No doubt,
some of these funds will be misspent or foolishly invested by future tribal councils, but that is to be expected and absorbed as
corrective guidance for future collective action. The "social discount" rate governing the impact of such expected tribal mistakes lowers their cost to near zero over these Indian peoples'
long-term future.3 3 2
330 MS. Phyllis Old Dog Cross articulates some of these concerns in her letters to

Senator Byron Dorgan (D. N.D.). She asks the Senator to investigate the proposed
referendum election now being held by the Tribal Council of the Three Affiliated
Tribes." She believes the plan is "not a wise move" and asks whether the "funds,

principle [sic] and interest [are] being protected as well as invested right now?" (on
file with author.)
331 Other Indian peoples, such as the Makah people along the Puget Sound in
Washington, focus more directly on the restoration of ancient cultural and economic
practices, such as the hunting and harpooning of five to six grey whales annually, as
the means of re-engaging their young people with the central reality of their people's
heritage.
332 Many Indian peoples seek to evaluate a present choice from the standpoint of
the "Seventh Generation." This practice impresses on the minds of today's Indian
leaders that the effects of their actions may well irredeemably mark the remote futures of. as yet, unborn Indian children.
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How This Disjunctive Moment Will Support the Renewal of
the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples

Over the past two hundred years the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara peoples have become enfolded into a non-Indian historical process from which they may now have the opportunity to
escape. Moreover, their conscious assumption of their economic
and social recovery task will lift them outside of this historical
process.
Because these Indian people have been enveloped for so long
within a dependency-generating historical process, they will have
to expend a great deal of collective social and emotional energy
to escape. They should perhaps listen to my young daughter's
preschool song about successfully confronting an obstacle that is
"too deep to go under it, too wide to go around it, too high to go
over it, so I guess we'll have to go through it."
By penetrating this veil of a burdening American historical experience, the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples can restore
their distinctive character within a radically resituated Fort Berthold Reservation. By much expenditure of social and emotional
energy, these Indian peoples can redefine their place within the
evolving societal mosaic of America. Such conscious self-exertion marks the classic strategy of the Indian peoples in carving
out a place for themselves within an often hostile American
333
society.
The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara people, in embarking on
their path of social and economic recovery, must confront the
high psychic and social costs imposed on their peoples by the accumulated effects of their American historical experience.
Cross-cultural psychologists characterize the "spiritual injury"
caused by "inter-generational post traumatic stress disorder" as a
"soul wound.

' 334

Converting this $149.5 million into an effective therapy requires the development of strategies that will directly address the
333 Regaining what Anthony Giddens calls the "human agency of control" over
one's own life experiences has fueled Indian peoples' resistance to the hegemonic
influence of federal Indian law over their collective and individual lives. Federal
Indian law is, among other things, a "symbolic order" that has long sought to
"dominat[e] ...the everyday context of [Indians'] lived experience." By disrupting
the federal government's effort to "connect signification and legitimation" of such
hegemonic efforts, the Indian peoples' have been able to survive federal Indian law.
MUMBY, supra note 274, at 82-83.
334 See, supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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assorted maladies that evidence the "soul wound" to the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples. This will be the major task for
collective action by these Indian peoples as they pursue social
and economic recovery on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
Can this money effectively catalyze the deliberative social action
transmission of socienecessary to "break" the inter-generational
335
society?
Indian
this
within
trauma
tal
2.

Catalyzing the "New Constitution" for the Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara Peoples

The repeated and necessary confrontations among powerful
tribal constituencies in constructing effective social action on the
Fort Berthold Reservation will eventually result in a new constitution for the Three Affiliated Tribes. This new constitution will
reconnect these contesting tribal constituencies with a renewed
understanding of their peoples' latent and emerging values. At a
pragmatic and instrumental level, these confrontations will distill
these values and understandings into socially-accountable political expression requiring effective and responsive institutions of
governance. At a societal level, these confrontations will progressively re-embed the tribal government within a renewed tribal identity. Only through such a reconstitutionalizing effect will
they reclaim their tribal institutions from their imposed, Americanized functions under John Collier's IRA and federal Indian
common law.3 36
I will offer only general guidelines for this task: to do more
would unduly intrude into the free sovereign choice of these Indian peoples. My recommendations draw upon A. K. Sen's recent constructive approach to social governance as the essential
means for realizing human freedom. First, such a tribal constitution would consciously promote the full development of the
human capabilities of individual tribal members by according
them appropriate opportunities for meaningful social and political participation. Second, such a tribal constitution would explicitly promote the growth of traditional tribal constituencies and
335 Id.

336 By restoring "narrative capacity" to the Indian peoples, they are removed
from the "strategies of containment" evidenced in federal Indian law decisions.
Federal Indian law accomplishes its goal by imposing a "sense of determinacy on the
[Indian] social actor's world, simultaneously obscuring ways in which reality is over
determined; that is, structured by the underlying relations of power that place material limitations on how social reality is framed." MUMBY, supra note 274, at 106.
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encourage the articulation of their interests and values in a socially-comprehensible manner. Third, such a tribal constitution
would require the ruling tribal leadership to demonstrate that it
"hears" their peoples' demands and needs by responding in a politically and socially accountable manner.3 37
Two additional background requirements provide the context
for the "working-out" of this new tribal constitution. First, these
Indian peoples must consciously reject what Professor Mary
Midgley calls the paralyzing "menace of fatalism. '338 This fatalism is embodied in the prevailing American view that innate genetic, cultural or biological factors have doomed the
contemporary Indian societies to decline and eventual disappearance. Many Indian people, including some on the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation, have "bought into" this view. Only by consciously rejecting such fatalism about their future as an Indian
people will the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara people avoid a paralysis of the needed action.3 39
Second, the Indian people must adopt the principle of
"enoughness" as expressing their confidence that they can effectively use their existing material and social resources in defining
and meeting their pressing social and economic recovery needs.
Only by presuming that $149.5 million can be subdivided into
enough societal resources-income, food, power, prestige and
authority-to meet their peoples' needs in a socially accountable
manner, will this reconstitutionalizing process succeed on the
Fort Berthold Reservation. This principle requires future tribal
councils to prudently "grow" this $149.5 million in a manner that
creates a sustainable "steady-state" tribal economy so as to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of societal resources.340
III
CONCLUSION:

RECONCILIATION

Reconciling the past two hundred years of federal-Indian relations requires the American and Indian peoples to escape from a
"history that no one wanted. '34 1 This history, embodied in its
337 See SEN, supra note 275, at 145-59.
338 MARY MIDGLEY, WICKEDNESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY

93-98 (1984).

339 Id.
340

Id.

341 DENNIS M.
SOCIETY

WRONG. THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: WHAT UNITES AND

236-43 (1994).
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main engine-federal Indian law-still seeks to remake the Indian peoples by altering their somatic features, languages, territorial distributions, governmental institutions, as well as their
cultural and religious belief-systems. This history has damaged,
and continues to damage, the American and Indian peoples in
fundamental ways. It has demeaned, and continues to demean, a
proud and accomplished people, the American people, who, to
create this history, openly flouted their most basic and cherished
tenets of life, liberty and happiness for all Americans. It has
proven unduly destructive of the lives and resources of the Indian peoples, the American people's ostensible wards entitled to
their solicitude and protection. It has proven to be a yahoo's history of the American West and only yahoos would wish it to
continue.3 4 2
Why this unwanted history is so tenaciously and continually
reproduced in federal Indian law decisions requires us to look at
its generative source. Freud viewed its generative source in this
manner:
Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who
at most can defend themselves if attacked; they are, on the
contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to
be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result,
their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual
object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without
compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize
his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture
and kill him, Homo homini lupus. Who in the face of all his

experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion? As a rule this cruel aggressiveness waits
for some provocation or puts itself at the service of some other
purpose, whose goal might also have been reached by milder
measures. In circumstances that are favorable to it, when the
mental counter-forces which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action, it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as a
savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is
something alien. Anyone who calls to mind the atrocities
342 Nathan Glazer quotes the historical musing of one such yahoo, Teddy
Roosevelt, who concludes in his history of The Winning of the West that:

Looking back, it is easy to say that much of the wrong-doing could have
been prevented; but if we examine the facts to find out the truth, not to
establish a theory, we are bound to admit that the struggle could not possibly have been avoided ... Unless we were willing that the whole continent
west of the Alleghenies should remain an unpeopled waste, the hunting
ground of savages, war was inevitable.
Glazer, supra note 43, at 12-13.
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committed during the racial migrations or the invasion of the
Huns, or by the people known as Mongols under [Genghis]
Khan and Tamerlane, or at the capture of Jerusalem by the
pious Crusaders, or even, indeed the horrors of the recent
World War-anyone who calls these things to3 4 mind
will have
3
to bow humbly before the truth of this view.
This unwanted history and its child, federal Indian law, were
born out of such a crucible of national aggression exalted by
Teddy Roosevelt and others. This history remains fresh in the
minds of its adherents only through its constant re-enactment.
Thus the new "Indian wars" are now cast as legal struggles over
Indian land, sovereignty and beliefs. These ritualized aggressions
allow a new American generation to renew their mythic kinship
ties, forged long ago in the heat, blood and sweat of their remote
ancestors' wars to dispossess the Indian peoples. Not surprisingly, Freud concluded that such a history of "ethnic nationalism" becomes the means by which law embodies and re-enacts
the aggressive instincts of its people so as to enable their identification and reinforce their loyalty to the state:
[The] state has forbidden the practice of wrong-doing, not because it desired to abolish it, but because it desires to monopolize it, like salt and tobacco. The warring state permits itself
every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as would disgrace the individual man.1344

This history renders, for me, banal the efforts of contemporary
legal commentators to remake federal Indian law via critique.3 45
Even if successful in its own terms, it reinforces what Erik Erikson calls the "pseudo-speciation" of a group: in this case, of Indian peoples as tribes. Only a new history, not the yahoo's
history of the American West, created by the Indian peoples
themselves will serve to rebuild their lives, cultures and
economies.3 4 6

Some argue that this old American history is already in eclipse
and that a new American history is waiting to be born. Some will
mourn, like James Truslow Adams who published The Epic of
America in 1931, this passing of the old America. 347 He spoke of
343 WRONG,
344

supra note 341, at 141.

Id. at 174.

345 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B.

NEWS

& J. 6 (1992).

346 WRONG,

supra note 341, at 181.

347 Glazer, supra note 43, at 16.
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America as:
That dream ...has evolved from the hearts and burdened
souls of many millions, who have come to us from all nations.
If some of them have too great faith, we know not yet to what
faith may attain, and may harken to the voice of one of them,
Mary Antin, a young immigrant who comes to us from Russia.
...Sitting on the steps of the Boston Public Library, where the
treasures of the whole of human thought had been opened to
her, she wrote: "This is my latest home, and it invited me to a
glad new life ....

The past cannot hold me, because I have

grown too big; just as the little house in Polotzk, once my
home, has now become a toy of memory, as I move about in
the wide spaces of this splendid palace. .

.

.America is the

youngest of nations, and inherits all that went before it in history. And I am the youngest of America's children, and into
my hands is given all her priceless heritage .... Mine
348 is the

whole majestic past, and mine is the shining future."

A noted Harvard sociologist, Nathan Glazer, characterizes this
newborn American history as one fraught with doubts, hesitancies and fears, just as its old history was characterized by optimism, confidence and a boundless sense of American power:
This brings us up to date in considering America as epic. The
epic of the frontier closed a long time ago. Many have worried
about what succeeds it. Let us project America overseas,
some have said, in imperialist conquest, or in fighting tyranny,
or in improving the life of other peoples. We have now withdrawn from the empire, though a few places remain. We face
no great tyranny, and our will in facing even small tyrannies is
not strong. We are now doubtful about our capacity to improve the lives of other peoples. The new frontier, we are
told, must be education, or space, or good group relations.
How often have we heard it said: How come we can reach the
moon and not improve our cities or race relations? Clearly it
must be easier to reach the moon, and that does require heroes and is a subject of epic stature. I doubt whether the improving of group relations can replace the conquest of a
continent as the subject of an epic. Of course, we can live
without an American epic. But that does diminish us, and it is
easy to understand why some
34 9 of our poets, artists, writers and
historians keep on trying.
Any new American epic of history would be radically incomplete, in my mind, without a prominent place reserved for the
Indian peoples. They are rich in those redemptive social and cul348

Id. at 18.

349 Id. at 20.
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tural beliefs and practices that "hold societies together. '350
These are the precise affiliative resources that the American people have lost-families, small groups and networks of interacting
individuals cooperating in the pursuit of common goals.3 5 '
Whereas Americans of all ages are actively encouraged to economically and socially embrace the increasingly abstract relations
of the new "bio-cybernetic" society3 5 2 the Indian peoples-insulated by poverty, by remoteness and by their legal status as
tribes-have the opportunity to reinvigorate their "flesh and
blood" life-worlds.
Because there is no "off-ramp" from America's information
society into Indian Country, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has been directed by Congress to build an information bridge into the Indian peoples' lives. 3 But the Indian
peoples are not asking for such an information technology to enrich their lives. Instead they are simply asking for the freedom
promised by the old America, a freedom not granted to the Indian peoples. Or, in response to the new America's offer of information technologies, some of the older Indians may say, as
Kant did long ago, the only information that really matters for
human use is already encoded in the "hieroglyphs of the
4
heart.

35

350 WRONG, supra note 341, at 242.
351 Id.

352 Anthony Giddens clearly distinguishes between "social integration" and "systems integration":
With the development of abstract systems, trust in impersonal principles, as
well as in anonymous others, becomes indispensable to social existence.
Nonpersonalized trust of this sort is discrepant from basic trust. There is a
strong psychological need to find others to trust, but institutionally organized personal connections are lacking, relative to pre-modern social situations. .

.

. Routines which were previously part of everyday life or the

"lifeworld" become drawn off and incorporated into abstract systems ....
Routines which are structured by abstract systems have an empty, unmoralised character-this much is valid in the idea that the impersonal increasingly swamps the personal.
WRONG, supra note 341, at 233-34.

353 But the FCC's order of June 20, 2000, seeking to promote universal service
within Indian Country, will likely fail because of the threshold requirement that Indian tribes demonstrate state authority to designate and regulate communication
carriers serving tribal lands has been preempted by federal law. Jennifer L. King,
Increasing Telephone Penetration Rates and Promoting Economic Development on
Tribal Lands: A Proposal to Solve the Tribal and State JurisdictionalProblems, 53
FED. COMM. L.J. 137, 140-41 (2000).
354 JOHN DURHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A HISTORY OF THE IDEA
OF COMMUNICATION 254 (1999).
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